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Purpose Statement 
This publication is by, and largely for, the academic communities of the twenty-eight colleges and universities 
of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. It is published by the Division for Higher Education and 
Schools of the ELCA. The publication has its home at Capital University, Columbus, Ohio which has 
generously offered leadership, physical, and fmancial support as an institutional sponsor for the publication. 
The ELCA has frequently sponsored conferences for faculty and administrators which have addressed the 
church - college/university partnership. The ELCA has sponsored an annual Vocation of the Lutheran College 
conference. The primary purpose of INTERSECTIONS is to enhance and continue such dialogue. It will do so 
by: 
* Lifting up the vocation of Lutheran colleges and universities
* Encouraging thoughtful dialogue about the partnership of colleges and universities with the church
* Offering a forum for concerns and interests of faculty at the intersection of faith, learning, and teaching
* Raising for debate issues about institutional missions, goals, objectives, and learning priorities
* Encouraging critical and productive discussion on our campuses of issues focal to the life of the church
* Serving as a bulletin board for communications among institutions and faculties
* Publishing papers presented at conferences sponsored by the ELCA and its institutions
* Raising the level of awareness among faculty about the Lutheran heritage and connectedness of their
institutions, realizing a sense of being part of a larger family with common interests and concerns.
From the Publisher 
While the primary source of articles for this journal is the papers presented at the annual conference on "The 
Vocation of a Lutheran College," we now receive other submissions for it as well. We also ask for permission 
to publish papers based on other presentations we hear that deal with "our" topics. In Issue 17 last year we 
published four papers that were developed by participants in the Lutheran Academy of Scholars in Higher 
Education, and this issue includes some other papers by participants in that academy. 
The Lutheran academy was started with generous grant support from Lutheran Brotherhood and the Lilly 
Endowment, but those grants have now been exhausted. Fortunately, the colleges and universities that are 
related to the ELCA recognized that the academy could be a very valuable faculty development opportunity, so 
the academy has been continued with support from the ELCA Division for Higher Education and Schools and 
from the colleges themselves. Especially important is support from St. Olaf College, which made it possible 
for Dr. DeAne Lagerquist, professor of religion at St. Olaf, to take on the task of being the director for the 
academy. 
In 2004 the academy has returned to Harvard University, and the leader is again Dr. Ronald Thiemann, the 
John Lord O'Brian professor of Divinity at Harvard. At the academy, each of the participants work on 
scholarly papers in their discipline, and they also participate in scholarly exchanges about the relationships 
between their faith and their profession, and between religion and society, and they work on interdisciplinary 
papers, learning from each other both in topical discussions led by the leader and in critiques of the work each 
faculty member presented. 
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In addition to the papers presented in INTERSECTIONS, numerous other scholarly articles and books have 
been published by the participants based on the work they did as participants in the academy. We want to 
especially draw your attention to a book written by the editor of INTERSECTIONS, Dr. Tom Christenson, The 
Gift and Task of Lutheran Higher Education, published this year by Augsburg Fortress. That volume should 
be of special interest to the many people who are fascinated by the topics of this journal. 
Arne Selbyg 
Director, ELCA Colleges and Universities 
From the Editor 
It must be that I'm getting old; time is becoming more valuable to me every year and I find that I am becoming 
less patient with not having enough of it. And please don't be fooled- time is not money. Increases in salary 
are often accompanied by decreases in time. I don't know how my students do it, but some of them lead such 
multi-tasked lives - school, work, family- how do they manage it? The candle they're burning must have 
three ends. I'm able to dance to only one drummer at a time (and that not too well), and some of my previous 
dance partners are finding that I'm already dancing with someone else (or distractedly, as if with someone 
else). All of this is by way of saying that I'm looking for someone who's willing to take over this job - I 
already have too many others to do well. But it's a job I think is important to do so I hope someone is willing to 
do it. 
So I thought to post a help-wanted ad: 
Wanted: editor of Intersections. Salary, none. Released time, none. Work load, light with periodic 
chaos. Experience required, none. Rewards, great if you've got a vivid imagination. Everything else, 
negotiable. Application deadline, sooner or later. 
This issue features the work of three friends and one new acquaintance. By reading what they have written you 
may become well-informed about the state of Lutheran higher education, about the significance of the work of 
Paul Ricouer, about the implications of being a reformation community, about the perils and difficulties of 
teaching ethics. All of these authors would be pleased to hear your comments on their work. 
Tom Christenson 
tchriste@capital.edu 
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Academic Vocation: What the Lutheran University has to Offer 
Wendy Mccredie 
The tension between bonds of particular love and a love which is open to every neighbor ... cannot be overcome by any 
theory, however intricate. Our thinking can only warn against certain mistakes, certain wrong turnings which we might take. 
But this central problem of the Christian life must be lived, not just thought. -Gilbert Meilaender 
A Methodological Prologue 
Faculty, students, and staff at the colleges, universities, 
and seminaries of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in 
America (ELCA) live and work in the tension Gilbert 
Meilaender describes above. However, in spite of 
numerous attempts, those of us who care about the 
church-relatedness of our universities have not 
adequately articulated this tension to our students, to our 
constituencies, or even among ourselves. In fact, central 
claims in the Lutheran tradition forestall such an 
adequate articulation while simultaneously requiring its 
continued pursuit. Each of us who attempts such an 
articulation will do so from disciplinary and faith 
perspectives that will both neglect and supplement 
others' points. None of our articulations can stand alone, 
yet each of them coheres around a central dialogical 1
tension between the bonds of faith, on the one hand, and 
the openness and love faith inspires for others and for 
God's created world, on the other hand. What follows is 
one more attempt to articulate productively this dialogical 
tension and to suggest how it can promote practical and 
useful understandings of the vocation of the ELCA­
related colleges and universities. 
Because profession is intimately grounded confession, 
this essay begins with an outline of the determining 
features of my faith as it influences my thoughts. The 
next section moves away from personal confession to the 
communal concern about the future of the church-related 
college, and the last sections represent various dialogical 
engagements with that concern in a specifically Lutheran 
context. What I write here, I write as a practicing 
Lutheran and a trained literary scholar. Until very 
recently, I taught at a university with "Lutheran" in its 
name; I now work at the churchwide offices of the 
ELCA. From one perspective, therefore, I write from a 
position of insider privilege. From another perspective, 
my lack of formal theological training may raise 
questions about my authority. In any case, for a Lutheran 
who believes the church is semper reformanda and who 
is one among the "priesthood of all believers," any 
privilege associated with teaching at a Lutheran 
university simultaneously constitutes a responsibility. 
My privileged position requires a constant interrogation 
of both my faith and the institutions that claim to nurture 
it. I am called to investigate both confessional and 
professional claims. 
Being a Christian in the Lutheran tradition means that I 
have faith in Christ, in God's scandalous self­
revelation-a self-revelation that transgresses and 
suspends God's own law. Christ, God Incarnate, 
transgresses the law that separated the divine from the 
human. Jesus Christ thus embodies paradox and invites 
dialogue between God and human. This faith in God's 
scandalous self-revelation in Christ motivates an attitude 
of service to that good God and love for my neighbor. 
My service is motivated by faith, and God's grace 
enables its efficacy. 
From that attitude of service motivated by faith, reason 
helps determine what is faithful, what I might best do, 
here and now. This requirement or call to act is as 
universal as the gracious love to which it is a response. 
Always, however, I attempt to act with an attitude of 
humility, because I might be wrong. In fact, it is not only 
reason that discerns appropriate action; it is God's grace 
that allows for the possibility that I might be right in that 
discernment. 
The recognition of the limitations of and on human 
reason may be the most difficult hurdle for scholars to 
overcome. To be called to employ human reason and to 
act in accordance with that reason, while simultaneously 
understanding that reason errs, seems quite silly, even 
foolish. If one uses the best tools, intellectual or 
otherwise, to solve a problem, it is quite difficult to act on 
that solution in good faith, while at the same time 
recognizing that those best tools might not be adequate to 
the project. Indeed, they might in fact have precluded the 
finding of the best solution. Such a paradox can lead to a 
paralysis that makes action in the world impossible. 
How does one recover from such a paralysis, perhaps 
brought on by too much knowledge? Faith in God's 
grace makes it possible actually to do what I have 
reasoned I must do in order to promote goodness and 
justice, even though I know that whatever I do will not 
eliminate all injustice in the world; it may even 
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perpetuate some injustice that I did not recognize. 
Moreover, my witness to my faith, my evangelizing of 
the freedom it confers on me, is most true to itself when I 
respect the freedom of others. I am not trying to convert, 
to make little Lutherans of my colleagues or my students. 
I am working in service to God's words of hope for peace 
and justice. I do not condemn my colleagues who do not 
share the particularity of my beliefs; I listen hard to the 
challenges they present to me. I struggle with the ways 
in which I and the institution-both the church and the 
university-fall short of the ideal community, but I try to 
keep before me the gospel, the good news of forgiveness 
and redemption. 
Why worry about our vocation, or calling, to be 
Lutheran colleges and universities? 
Like many church-related universities, Texas Lutheran 
University has struggled to articulate for itself and for 
others what its middle name might mean. What 
motivates this need to situate ourselves? Are we fearful 
of losing students, of not responding to the market, of 
ceasing to exist, of leaving the church, of becoming the 
church? Or is there something good we do that ought not 
to be lost? Are we motivated by fear or by love? 
Since the publication of E. D. Hirsch's Cultural Literacy, 
Allan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind, and 
William Bennett's Book of Virtues, there have been 
numerous fairly popular critiques of the American 
academy. These books, while at times simplistic in their 
analyses (perhaps precisely because of that simplicity), 
do resonant with an audience beyond what the public 
names the "ivory tower of academia." For that public, 
what we do in the universities remains esoteric, 
theoretical, valueless, and suspect. 
For writers such as Hirsch, we are no longer teaching the 
right things, the things that will provide our students, 
when they are no longer our students, access to the world 
imperialist tools; the complaints go on. Bennett's Book 
of Virtues, which is sold at supermarket checkouts as well 
as in university bookstores, elaborates the Bloomian and 
Hirschite themes by providing a list of virtues that will 
solve our problems if we could just get them back into 
the public arena; that is, teach them to our children.2 
Bennett's work does for K-12 what Bloom's and Hirsch's 
did for colleges and universities. 
My characterization of these pos1t10ns and the 
descriptions about where we have gone wrong and how 
we ought to fix it may be rather hasty and overly 
generalized, but the point is, they think we have gone 
wrong; there are a lot of folk who agree with them. 
Michael Berube and Cary Nelson sum up the situation of 
the 1990s this way: 
The 1990s have not been kind to 
American institutions of higher 
education. Academy-bashing is now 
among the fastest-growing of major U.S. 
industries, and the charges are as 
numerous as the bashers themselves: 
teachers don't teach; scholars fritter 
away their time and your tax dollars on 
studies of music videos; campus 
regulations thwart free speech; the 
Western cultural heritage is besieged by 
tenured radicals; heterosexual white 
men are under attack from feminist, 
multiculturalist, and gay and lesbian 
groups; universities are buying luxury 
yachts with federal research dollars; 
academic standards of all kinds are in 
tatters; undergraduates lack both reading 
skills and moral foundations; and, in the 
midst of all this, to add financial insult 
to intellectual injury, college tuitions are 
skyrocketing. (Berube 1) 
of the culturally elite. For Bloom and his followers, most Berube and Nelson go on to document the shift from 
of us, with the exception of a few enlightened political concern about political correctness in the academy to the 
philosophers, are no longer teaching the right things. We attempt to define what it is that we should be teaching 
are no longer doing so because we have succumbed to there. While Bloom and others lament the type of values 
faddish movements such as Women's Studies, African- taught in the academy, the latest move in the "culture 
American Studies, and Gay and Lesbian Studies, all of wars" is to lament the loss of values in the academy. 
hich have a political agenda beyond the academy. All Berube and Nelson recognize this double movement as 
se intellectual and curricular movements pollute the ironic. They summarize the character of the debates 
·ty of the academic endeavor by the importation of a surrounding higher education as revolving around two 
· /�mted political agenda into what should be a purely contradictory statements: "[Higher education] has 
intellectual endeavor. The syllabus is fragmented; the abandoned its mission by arrogantly seeking to shape 
objectives unclear at best and politically motivated at student's moral and civic lives, and, worse still, it has 
worst; assessment procedures, even the right of abandoned its mission to shape students' moral and civic 
professors to access students, come under attack as lives" (Berube 2). Berube and Nelson claim that while 
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faculty at large universities do inculcate values in their 
students, these values do not correspond to the values 
immediately conducive to the powerful corporate and 
governmental cultures pervasive outside the walls of 
academe. George Marsden, in The Outrageous Idea of 
Christian Scholarship, also notes that neutral and 
objective perspectives on truth, while still touted as 
desired, are routinely shunned in the academy in favor of 
identity-driven perspectives. The point is that even in the 
large research universities value-free education has not 
been available; it's just that the values being taught are 
not the values the secular world seems to require. In this 
respect the large universities and smaller, church-related 
universities resemble each other. For, with some 
exceptions, church-related colleges and universities in the 
Christian tradition claim that gospel-centered values also 
challenge the apparently selfish and self-serving 
principles of the capitalist marketplace and the corporate 
boardroom. 
So, whether we agree with Indiana University's Berube 
and Nelson or George Marsden on all counts, their claims 
that universities are inculcating values in the students 
warrant our close attention. Berube and Nelson's 
additional statistics on class size and teaching loads of 
professors in the liberal arts at public institution should 
also cause us to ponder what truly is the difference 
between Indiana University and places like Texas 
Lutheran University. For, in the admissions propaganda 
from small liberal arts colleges across the United States, 
the claims of small class size and individual attention 
from professors resound. However, if an account of large 
research universities can show that they too can offer 
such things, then where will our niche be? Are we really 
needed? What claims can we make for a unique 
educational experience? What rationale can we produce 
to justify our vocation as a Lutheran institution? 
As a Lutheran institution, we would betray our heritage if 
we were to become a fundamentalist "Bible" college, 
although we might find a significant clientele for such a 
college, especially in some regions of the country. We 
would likewise betray our heritage were we to become a 
generic liberal arts college, more or less like any other in 
the nation. The only option, it seems to me, is to 
establish for ourselves and for the general public what is 
distinctively Lutheran about us and why that distinctively 
Lutheran character is appropriate, perhaps even 
necessary, in the cmTent pluralistic cultural and academic 
climate. Why are we called to be the kinds of institutions 
we are? 
Confusion between the exigencies of the secular and 
the centrality of the sacred 
The modem university, while we think of it as a 
development of the medieval monastic tradition, and 
certainly Lutheran education must trace its roots to this 
tradition, also has significant roots in the agora, the open 
marketplace, of Athens. Jaroslav Pelikan, states: 
"Although the ancestors of the modem university are 
multiple and complex, including as they do the seats of 
learning in many ancient cultures, there is no denying 
that the university has deep roots also in the monastery 
and the church. Indeed, ... the medieval university was 
the foundation of the university as we know it . . . " 
(Pelikan 45). The twentieth century university provides 
both a contemplative place and one connected with the 
public space of the market and politics. Both the retiring, 
private scholar or the scientist who spends hours on end 
in the laboratory, and the public intellectual who views 
him or herself as duty-bound to change society for the 
better, find a conducive home in the academy. Our 
profession has no pre-established borders that define for 
us whether we are engaged more properly in a public, 
shared enterprise with, perhaps, certain responsibilities to 
established authority in the public domain, or whether our 
proper area of concern should be that of individual 
intellectual and ethical development. 
George Marsden' s works, especially The Soul of the 
American University, provide an interesting analysis of 
the role of the American university in training (for the 
marketplace) and educating (with an eye to spiritual 
formation) its future leaders. His emphasis is on higher 
education's public role. He identifies the post-Civil War 
era as the site of a decisive shift in higher education's 
goals. The North, having won the military victory, in 
large part because of its superior technological and 
industrial power, could also claim a moral victory. Moral 
and technological progress were linked; the land-grant 
colleges were set up to initiate students into the practical 
and technological mysteries of modern industrial society; 
and the Eastern establishment universities began to move 
beyond their missions as simply training grounds for the 
clergy. They became the forerunners of the modem 
research university and began the disciplinary 
specialization we take for granted, and sometimes resist. 
Mark Schwehn' s book Exiles in Eden analyzes the 
historical and cultural roots of the currently specialized 
disciplines. He suggests that the American research 
university modeled itself after the German universities 
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and especially after Max Weber's ideas on what properly 
constituted studies at the university. That is, in the 
university academics aimed for "mastery of the world 
through calculation and control" (Schwehn 58). Each 
academic discipline had its appropriate tools with which 
to fashion its understanding of the world. Weber's 
disciplined scholarly activity no longer has as a goal the 
universitas; the education of the whole person is not the 
goal, for questions of ultimate meaning have no place in 
Weber's academy. However, Weber's language imports 
to his severely pruned disciplines the moral discourse of 
the Puritans and provides added impetus for the liberal 
Protestant movement on the American academic scene. 
In the United States, the language that heretofore had 
been used primarily to describe spiritual as well as 
intellectual enlightenment was divorced from the realm 
of the spirit. It applied exclusively to the life of the mind. 
While Marsden identifies the roots of the disassociation 
of religion and the life of the mind in American 
nineteenth-century liberal progressive Protestantism, 
Schwehn contends that this disassociation owes at least 
as much to Weber's two works "Science as a Vocation" 
and The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism 
(Marsden 3-21). Weber's call to the German universities 
to pare all ultimate questions from the core of verifiable 
knowledge and the progressive Protestant ethic collude in 
applying the language of faith to the knowledge of the 
world. The results are twofold. First, certain disciplines, 
notably the natural sciences, whose methodologies 
resonate deeply with this call for particular, verifiable, 
and practical knowledge, come to the fore. Second, the 
university, as a locus of knowledge, substitutes for the 
church, as a locus of faith. Instead of faith motivating 
one's life in meaningful ways, knowledge provides a 
justification for action aimed primarily at obtaining 
practical results, verifiable and meaningful in precisely 
the same way to everyone. 
In The Idea of the University: A Reexamination, Jaroslav 
Pelikan recognizes the temptation to treat the university 
in the guise of mother of the soul, as an alma mater: 
Because I have been disappointed so 
often in institutional Christendom and 
because, by contrast, the university has 
Nicene Creed. It is not that; and if we 
act as though it were, we shall send a 
charge through the wires that the wires 
cannot carry, ending in idolatry or 
disaster. (Pelikan 66-67) 
The university culture forms Pelikan's core beliefs as it 
does most academics'. We, like Pelikan, are products of 
a university system that speaks of its mission to educate, 
its moral responsibility to inculcate virtues in its students, 
and its expectation that society's leaders come from its 
halls. Even in the state universities, according to 
Marsden, there is no question that the mission of the 
university or college as an institution of higher learning 
and research is consonant with the nineteenth-century 
liberal progressive mission of Christianity: 
Although self-conscious secularism is a 
significant force in academic 
communities, its strength has been 
vastly amplified by the convergence of 
. . . other forces . . .. Liberal 
Protestantism opposed traditional 
Christian exclusivism and helped rule it 
out of bounds. Methodological 
secularization provided a non­
controversial rationale for such a move, 
reinforced by beliefs concerning the 
universal dictates of science. Concerns 
about pluralism and justice supplied a 
moral rationale. Moreover, to all these 
forces can be added one ... , the widely 
held popular belief, sometimes 
suggested in the courts but not yet 
consistently applied, that government 
funding excludes any religious teaching. 
(Marsden 34) 
Marsden' s point is that the "secularization" of the 
university is a relatively recent phenomenon and, while in 
its beginning stages it was motivated by a Liberal 
Protestant ethic that had gone mostly unchallenged in the 
United States, it was undergirded by a belief in the saving 
power of the modem way of life, as exemplified, 
naturally, by the American experience. 
been for almost half a century the chief After World War II, university scholars begin to 
repository of truth and the community of challenge the modem agenda set by Descartes and 
wisdom to me personally, and is . . . elaborated by the 18th century Enlightenment 
my spiritual mother who has reared and philosophers. Foundationalism, rationalism and 
nourished me, . . . I have sometimes empiricism were themselves identified as biases. 
been in danger of regarding it as the Stephen Toulmin, in his remarkable book Cosmopolis, 
embodiment of the One Holy catholic identifies a double beginning for this modem era. The 
and Apostolic church affirmed in the first modems, argues Toulmin, are the Renaissance men 
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(and women?) of the 16th century. The Renaissance 
humanist tradition of Montaigne, Shakespeare, Erasmus, 
Luther and Rabelais ushers in the modem age. Descartes 
and the others react to that prior pluralistic tradition. 
Toulmin's work suggests, in what is no longer such a 
surprising move, that Descartes' desire for some certain 
ground from which all knowledge would follow, and 
would therefore be equally as certain as its ground, 
derived in no small measure from his historical and 
personal context. In a chaotic world dominated by 
political instability, religious conflict, and seemingly 
endless wars that did little to reestablish order, what 
could be more seductive than a theory or a perspective 
that would enable its holder to reestablish order with its 
application? 
Toulmin argues that Descartes' reductive philosophy 
constitutes a reaction to the humanistic impulse of the 
previous century. He wanted answers for all situations, 
not perspectives based on individual experience that 
might have been different if the experiences had differed. 
Descartes wanted a solid foundation for truth claims. At 
its root, Toulmin suggests, the rationalist project is not 
purely rational; it is embedded in the social and political 
particularities of Europe in the 16th and early 17th 
centuries, and the desire for social, economic, political 
and theological order that continues to be expressed 
through the 20th century. The Enlightenment dream of a 
universal human truth, determined by rational thought 
and divorced from particular contingencies, proves just 
that-a dream. 3 Perhaps it is even a nightmare. 
In the current academic climate, some still cling to the 
Enlightenment's rational dream. Most, however, 
recognize the inadvisability, if not the impossibility, of 
pursuing its ends. However, the privileged 
spokespersons for public political and cultural agenda, 
the polis, and the marketplace, the agora, still call for 
universalizable virtues that we can all agree on no matter 
who we are or where we come from. We need these 
virtues, so the argument goes, in order to "get down to 
business." It is all very well for privileged university 
professors to argue about the contingencies of truth, 
about moral and factual relativism, about the inability to 
ever completely and objectively know something, but the 
rest of America has work to do! Hence, I would suggest, 
the rise of Christian fundamentalism, of biblical 
literalism, and of unthoughtful recourse to authority and a 
tradition (mis)understood as static. The academy, 
naturally (and appropriately), objects. And so should 
Lutherans. 
What the Lutheran University has to offer 
Lutherans should object, and have been objecting albeit 
quietly, since the first Lutheran college opened its doors. 
Our educational system is grounded in that Renaissance 
of the sixteenth century and the advances of the ensuing 
centuries inform it. But at the core of an education in the 
Lutheran tradition are the affirmation of the human being 
in this world, God's creation, and a simultaneous 
affirmation of our essential connection with the kingdom 
of God. Thus, at the core of Lutheran education there is a 
recognized and theologically complex tension between 
the sacred and the secular. In his book Lutheran Higher 
Education, Ernest Simmons asserts that "a sharp line 
between the sacred and the secular cannot be drawn for 
the Lutheran tradition" (33). The public space of politics 
and the marketplace must not be divorced from the 
spiritual and intellectual tradition of the monastery. 
Indeed, scholars at Lutheran-related colleges, 
universities, and seminaries ought to respond to the 
exigencies of the secular without losing sight of the 
centrality of the sacred. "The academic institutions of the 
church, colleges and seminaries, carry special 
responsibility ... as frontier places for the engagement of 
Word and world" (Simmons 29). It is our responsibility 
to put the sacred and the secular in conversation with one 
another. 
In Models for Christian Higher Education, Richard 
Hughes identifies as distinctive the Lutheran affirmation 
of human being. We delight in our humanity even as we 
recognize that humans are not perfect. While we are in 
the world (and we love it, for it is God's creation and a 
gift), we understand our world to be limited and are 
inspired by what is beyond this world. This inspiration of 
the kingdom of God helps us to critically assess the 
created world that we so enjoy and to recognize its 
imperfections along with its joys. 
The Lutheran tradition delights in discovery and 
exploration of this world, even as those discoveries might 
lead us to despair of the human propensity for destruction 
and other evils. These discoveries may also sow doubt 
and can lead to the loss of faith. On the other hand, such 
doubt can also lead to a greater awareness of God's 
infinite grace and a subsequent strengthening of faith. 
Because we live in this world, there are, however, no 
guarantees that we will experience the latter 
strengthening rather than the former loss. This 
uncertainty is a mark of our humanity. If we never risk 
the loss of faith, we risk intellectual and spiritual 
stagnation; we betray our God-given nature. 
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Born out of the monastic university tradition, the 
Lutheran faith tradition is one grounded in the search for 
knowledge and the understanding of how best to use that 
knowledge to serve our neighbor and honor our gracious 
God. Our mission in the universities is to continue to 
serve the church and to make knowledge accessible to 
all-not just to a privileged few who read the required 
language. We educate in the language of the people, for 
Luther believed God's truth should be available to all in a 
language they could understand. Hence, all should learn 
to read and God's word should be translated from Latin 
into German and other vernaculars. Our universities 
participate in this on-going mission to educate. Not all 
our students will be Christians (the privileged class in our 
contemporary American setting), but all should have 
access to knowledge. Without knowledge, how can one 
take care of and participate well in God's created world? 
As Lutheran tradition resists an easy separation of the 
sacred from the secular, so it resists the collapse of the 
two. The tension between God's kingdom and this world 
remains unresolved. This lack of resolution makes 
possible continued dialogue. We do not have all the 
answers, but we have God's assurance that not having all 
the answers, living with paradoxes, ambiguities, and 
pluralism is part of what it means to be human. Our job is 
to use the gifts from God in order to do the best job 
possible here and now, in this world. Just as our 
relationship with God is unmediated by any human 
authority, just as that relationship with Christ is an 
individual responsibility sustained by and within the 
context of a faith community, so our relationship with 
knowledge must be an individual responsibility. The 
primary community in which that relationship to 
knowledge is developed and sustained is the academic 
community. The Lutheran universities, and one hopes 
the Lutheran church and its congregations, recognize the 
ways in which our faith in God and our knowledge of the 
world are intricately linked. In an age as uncertain and as 
violent as Descartes' century, will we succumb to 
temptation and attempt easy resolutions? Will we give in 
to the demands of political correctness of whatever ilk or 
to market pressures? If we do so, we betray our Lutheran 
tradition that calls us to live in the fallen human world 
that is nevertheless a gift from God and to be enjoyed and 
sustained. We must respond to God's redeeming grace 
by leading lives "of grace-filled freedom and loving 
service, or joyful hope and commitment" (Simmons 26). 
colleges?" Some church-related colleges and universities 
respond to this question by bracketing it: The others do 
not belong to this community; non-Christians need not 
apply. If there are no others to include, the question of 
inclusivity is moot. This attitude betrays the insights of 
the modem era; it also betrays Luther's understanding of 
the two kingdoms and his call to us to ask difficult 
questions. "[T]he Christian is called to make common 
cause with all people, including those of other faiths, in 
providing for a just and healthy world" (Simmons 27). 
Currently, spiritual and moral education are affirmed 
"add-ons'; to the primary academic mission of the 
university, even at institutions that have a close relation 
with their church bodies.4 Many of the ELCA colleges 
and universities would fall, or almost fall, into this 
description. The spiritual is relegated to the realm of the 
extra-curricular and housed in campus ministry and the 
Fellowship of Christian Athletes and some other student 
groups whose spiritual lives are fulfilled through 
participation in these extra-curricular activities. When 
we are teaching in the liberal arts university and our goal 
is integrated knowledge and development of the whole 
person, then the add-on approach is inappropriate. To 
eliminate my Lutheran Christian perspective from my 
teaching amounts to an intellectual and spiritual 
dishonesty that should not be tolerated. Any attempt to 
excise reference to Christian (or any other) particularity 
from our classrooms, our offices, or our scholarship does 
a disservice to our colleagues and ourselves. 
Alisdair MacIntyre suggests that the university is the site 
of "constrained disagreement." In order to participate in 
this constrained disagreement, students deserve to have 
as many avenues to truth as possible opened to them. 
Likewise, colleagues can only effectively engage each 
other's ideas if those ideas are shared in good faith. 
Since we live in the tension between God's created world 
and God's divine kingdom, if we neglect one or the other, 
we are liable to arrest the dialogue not only between the 
two kingdoms, but also between teacher and student and 
among colleagues. 
Putting the Christian agenda on the academic table is 
risky. To engage in discussion in good faith, one must be 
willing to listen well to the other side. Nicholas 
Wolterstorff says poignantly, 
Practical considerations for the future Whereas for a long time now it has been 
the calling of the Christian scholar to 
Obviously, in a society as pluralistic as ours, we must ask emphasize that Christianity offers a 
ourselves, "How can we make our universities open to distinctive perspective on reality, the 
others and still maintain our uniqueness as Lutheran time may be coming when it will be at 
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least as important to emphasize our 
shared humanity and the importance of 
mutual listening. If what emerges from 
the overthrow of the hegemony of 
Eurocentric bourgeois white males is not 
speaking and listening in dialogue but 
hard-of-hearing multiple power 
constellations, then nothing has been 
gained. (W olterstorff 26) 
We cannot take this caution too seriously, and we must 
realize that in entering the conversation, we agree to 
listen as part of our responsible participation. Indeed, our 
Christianity itself mandates this listening. 
A theology of the cross requires us to be loving members 
of the community; it requires us to listen to those who are 
marginalized by, because, of, or in spite of the 
community. In such listening, we embody the 
faithfulness to God's love that Jesus embodied when he 
listened to the Galilean woman, when he spoke with the 
Samaritan woman at the well, when he affirmed the 
listening woman, Mary. At all these times, he rebuked 
his disciples for a too narrow interpretation of his 
mission; he rebuked them for their reliance on the law 
which he scandalously transgressed. Christ is the 
embodiment of transgression that mitigates all human 
transgressions. We cannot mitigate transgression; only 
God can. Likewise, we cannot know with certainty what 
does not transgress, what is right under the law; what is 
true in the Richard Rorty' s sense of truth. 5 
In the world of empirical proofs and inductive reasoning, 
we cannot get to God. However, God's resistance to 
rational thought (or vice versa) does not mean that it is 
unreasonable to believe in God or to believe in a 
particular self-revelation of God's self. In my case, I do 
believe in God. I experience God's presence in my life. 
I cannot prove that God touches my life; but no one can 
prove that God does not do so. Now having said that 
God is present in my life, let me also say that there are 
many times when I doubt whether I should believe. 
Some would claim that this doubt disqualifies me from 
claiming belief. I am, however, reassured by doubting 
Thomas-just the last instance of a disciple having to be 
shown that Christ's truth exceeds a limited legalistic 
understanding of the truth-and by my belief in God's 
abiding love for me; even when I doubt, God remains. 
Thus, here I am back in the web of my belief. 
Wolterstorff affirms that entanglement, as do I, as an 
appropriate perspective from which to engage in both 
research and teaching. It is an entanglement informed by 
both faith and doubt. I doubt that I, or anyone else who 
claims to, have the whole truth, the answer, the right that 
ends all wrongs, but I might and s/he might. 
In our teaching, in our collegial relationships, etc., we 
must therefore listen to the narratives of others, including 
those outside the Christian, outside the Lutheran 
tradition. Those traditions, as we articulate them in 
human languages, constitute the law. We respect the 
authority of the law, but live in the light of the gospel. 
All human institutions will fall short of the mark. In 
choosing to work within the Lutheran tradition, we 
recognize that both institutions and individuals fall short 
of the mark for which we aim. This is harmatia, which is 
translated in the Bible as sin and in Aristotle's 
Nicomachean Ethics as missing the mark ( of virtue). 
Recognizing that we all miss the mark of truth or virtue 
or justice does not excuse any of us from continuing to 
try to hit that mark. Trying to hit that mark constitutes 
our faithfulness to God's self-revelation in Christ Jesus. 
The recognition that we will miss the mark sows in us 
humility or at least it ought to. 
Pedagogical and theological dialogues 
I am faced with proclaiming my Lutheranness within the 
context of a Lutheran institution. It is the privileged 
position. I cannot claim that my voiced perspective is 
equal among the many I know are represented at our 
universities. In addition, a Christian perspective has 
been, and in some circles continues to be, associated with 
Eurocentric imperialism, patriarchy, racism, etc. It has 
sustained many bad things. Now, I claim that the 
Lutheran tradition has something good and vital to teach 
me and my colleagues who choose to work in institutions 
affiliated with the Lutheran tradition. I can make this 
claim because of the intellectual complexity of Lutheran 
theology and its insistence on dialogue. 
In Exiles from Eden, Schwehn suggests we reformulate 
our goals so that we recognize our quest as a communal 
one for integrated understanding, not an individual one 
for isolated certainty: 
Instead of Weberian mastery of the 
world through calculation and control, 
academics ought primarily to seek 
understanding of the world through 
communal inquiry. This latter endeavor 
follows quite naturally from the 
affections of awe, wonder, and gratitude 
that together constitute piety. Finally, 
the means-end rationality that defined 
the academic mind for Weber must be 
absorbed into a far more capacious 
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epistemology that views qualities of 
character, mind and spirit as integrally 
related to one another. (Schwehn 58) 
Likewise, a few years ago, Richard Hughes reminded the 
Lutheran college and university presidents that Lutheran 
theology insists on human finitude. Because of this 
insistence, "Lutherans can never absolutize their own 
perspectives, even their theological perspectives" 
(Hughes 6). In academe, our perspectives are determined 
not only by the particularities of history, but also by our 
training and disciplinary interests. If we are to remain 
true to the Lutheran tradition, these disciplinary 
perspectives can never be absolutized. Since the 
practitioners in each discipline participate in the quest for 
understanding, we must remain in dialogue with each 
other, not isolated in self-referential and self­
congratulatory niches of truth. 
In the classroom, we must demonstrate an approach to 
knowledge that eschews any rigid adherence to a set of 
preestablished methodologies. As educators in a 
Lutheran university environment, we are called to 
interdisciplinary approaches, recognizing the limiting and 
limited nature of a single discipline's approach to and 
effect on the truth. In addition, within our disciplines we 
are called to take advantage of multiple approaches and 
to continue to modify our approach to the subject matter 
proper to the discipline itself. 
There is no such thing as a neutral perspective. All truth 
claims are founded on some perspectival assumption. 
Even the claim that there is a truth devoid of particularity 
can only make sense in the context of a system that 
desires a universal, generically human truth; i.e., a truth 
that is true for all human beings at all times and in all 
places. This was the project of the Enlightenment. It has 
failed, but we should not, therefore, turn to nihilism. 
As a teacher, I must be aware of the power and authority 
I have, justified only by my position and preparation (not 
by God's grace). Even though I know that I might be 
wrong, my students will not know that; in some cases, 
they will not want to know that. My work is similar to 
that of any pastor. I am not a priest who mediates 
between her students and the truth. I do not hold the keys 
He did not set himself up as the authority who could 
teach others the right way to truth; he gave them the 
means to teach themselves. He did not condemn them for 
their ignorance, but facilitated their understanding. He 
gave them the means by which they could take personal 
responsibility for their relationship to God. We must 
provide the means to facilitate such relationships for our 
students in regards to truth and knowledge as well as to 
God. This is the Lutheran "priesthood of all believers" 
implemented in the classroom. 
Finally, the Lutheran church is a reforming church. It has 
not been reformed (past perfect), but is reforming 
(present progressive). As a member of the church at one 
of its universities, I investigate possible areas of reform. 
I am responsible for communicating to the church the 
view from the outside and modeling for the church how 
to engage in conversation with those outside the tradition. 
I may not do it very well, but I keep trying. Jesus is my 
model. He spoke to the woman at the well-unclean, 
adulteress, unbeliever, a person unacceptable under the 
law of Jesus' tradition. It was she to whom he first 
revealed himself. I must listen to those outside the 
tradition because God's work is not done just by people 
of the tradition. In fact, the lure of worldly wisdom can 
be so strong that sometimes little of God's work can be 
done; God's words are not heard; God's love is not 
experienced when we allow the constraining laws of the 
created world to override the Gospel of good news and 
loving kindness and God's infinite grace. 
This Lutheran understanding of ongoing reformation is 
essential to my teaching. Recognizing that my education 
(in French, my formation) is not past, nor perfect, I am 
freed from the need to be a perfect teacher, always right 
and in control at all times. I freely recognize my own 
fallibility and am thereby freed to listen to students' 
perspectives. I am freed to try new pedagogical 
approaches. And, most importantly, I am freed to 
critique myself and hear the criticisms of others, without 
those criticisms destroying me or my teaching. 
Essentially, I am freed from hegemonic claims by the one 
claim of Christ, and once again affirm the paradoxical 
situation of being in the world and simultaneously of the 
kingdom of God. 
..... to the Kingdom; Christ does, my students do. In Those of my colleagues who are not Christian and those 
eological terms, our students have as much access to who are Christian and not Lutheran and who work 
hrist, Truth, and knowledge as we do. We need to show alongside Lutherans in the Lutheran universities and 
m that they do have this access, remind them of it in colleges do so because in large measure they share the 
C,•\ Platonic sense. Our situation is similar to Luther's. concern for justice and for the non-judgmental search for 
}Yhen he traveled to country congregations, he was truth. This concern, however, is neither exclusively 
appalled by their lack of knowledge about the basic tenets Christian nor perhaps even particularly Lutheran. Many 
of Christianity. The result: Luther's Small Catechism. of them would claim, like me, that they engage in action 
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for the sake of love and justice for our neighbors. It is 
this commitment to non-judgmental understanding that 
promotes action for the sake of love and justice that 
unites us. It is we who embody both individually and 
collectively the Lutheran tradition. And, as with all 
embodiments, except the one in Christ, we fall short of 
the virtuous marks at which we aim. We sin. However, 
we live in the world in which the one perfect incarnation 
of truth was made possible through God's 
incomprehensible, infinite graciousness. This incarnation 
of truth simultaneously embodies the transgression of the 
law and continues to inspire, motivate and justify our 
imperfect aspiring embodiments of God's truth in the 
world. 
Wendy Mccredie is the associate director for interpretation in the Department for Communication at the ELGA 
churchwide office in Chicago. 
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Notes 
1 I have chosen this term primarily because "dialectic" has, unfortunately, come to have connotations of conflict that must be resolved 
through the sublation of one argument into another more comprehensive logic. "Dialogic," on the other hand, retains the sense of 
simultaneously unresolved and motivating logical movements. See Mikhail Bakhtin's The Dialogic Imagination. 
2 Two centuries ago, Benjamin Franklin also enumerated the virtues necessary for good living. His Autobiography, however, ironizes 
an unthoughtful, blinkered approach to virtues and demonstrates that one virtue may contradict another. 
3 See Richard Rorty' s Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity for an elaboration on the contingency of truth. 
4 Michael Beaty, "Perspectivalism and its Cultured Despisers," Baylor University, 15 July 1996, given as part of the Lilly Fellows 
Summer Seminar. 
5 "Truth is a property of linguistic entities, of sentences." Contingency, p. 7. 
INTERSECTIONS/Summer 2004 
-12-
Dual Citizenship in Athens and Jerusalem: Ricoeur's Hermeneutics and the Promise of 
Lutheran Higher Education 
Mark C. Mattes 
Beyond the desert of criticism we seek to be called again. -Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil. 
In contrast with other Christian approaches to the 
question of the relationship between faith and learning, 
which tend either to isolate faith from learning or to over­
accentuate a continuum between them, the Lutheran 
approach to Christian higher education seeks to develop a 
conversation between faith and learning that preserves 
the integrity of each and can address current secularistic 
biases that would inhibit the attempt to establish a 
dialogue between faith and learning. In an attempt to 
flesh out a model of dialogue that can help us better 
understand how to model a faith-based approach to 
higher education, one can look to the work of the 
contemporary French philosopher and theorist of 
language and interpretation, Paul Ricoeur. Ricoeur's 
work can provide a model for discerning various 
phenomenological elements of dialogue (such as 
listening, risk, open-endedness, and mutuality), offer a 
framework from within a "neutral" or non-faith 
perspective for making the dialogue between faith and 
learning a plausible and worthwhile endeavor, and show 
how education as a process is a profoundly hermeneutical 
task. His understanding of myth as an indispensable 
category for interpreting human behavior, truth primarily 
as manifestation and not correspondence, and 
secularism's ability to dehumanize people calls for a 
retrieval of a faith-based approach to education congenial 
to the Lutheran tradition. Himself a layman of the French 
Reformed Church, Ricoeur offers work that should help 
us clarify the educational dynamics that can be operative 
at Lutheran-related schools. 
In response to the dynamics of disengagement outlined 
by Marsden and Burtchaell, we need to maintain that 
Christian higher education should indeed attempt in a 
specifiable way to integrate faith and learning across the 
curriculum and in various facets of student life. 
Admittedly, a school is not a church-nor should it be. A 
school is a community of scholars seeking to further the 
life of the mind. However, the unique heritage and 
calling of church-related institutions of higher learning is 
to attempt to find ways for faith and learning to connect. 
This is a task unique to the church-related school, since it 
11; not promoted by secular institutions or by other 
agencies of the church. If we conceive of this integration 
as a conversation between faith and learning, we can 
recognize that both questions addressed to the faith from 
outside of faith and questions arising from the faith to 
that which is outside of faith are permitted and 
encouraged as essential components in the development 
of the life of the mind. In other words, unlike much 
secular-based education, Lutheran higher education 
proposes that questions of faith are worthy of one's 
reflection; and, in contrast to many sectarian Christian 
institutions, at Lutheran colleges and universities it is 
permissible--indeed sometimes necessary-to criticize 
our presuppositions of faith in the hope of refining our 
faith-inspired perspectives. Admittedly, this task is risky 
for faith. We might lose our faith in the process of self­
criticism. Nevertheless, as it will be seen, if we follow 
Luther's and/or Ricoeur's thinking, a faith that insists on 
security of whatever sort proves not to be genuine faith at 
all.1
In some perspectives in higher education, faith issues and 
questions are thought to be solely a private matter. In this 
view, scholars want to preserve human autonomy from 
the threat of authoritarianism and defend scientific 
research from the challenge of "obscuritanism." Hence, 
in their view, faith is an irrational disposition or blind 
acceptance of the religious legitimization of social 
institutions. By contrast, for church-related higher 
education, faith issues are thought to engage the life of 
the mind and even challenge our assumptions about 
social legitimization. Faith issues are permitted to be 
public, even though these issues will not receive univocal 
answers from church-related faculties, whose views often 
reflect the pluralism of the wider academy. Hence, 
church-related colleges should seek to foster both 
academic excellence and spiritual growth, and not just 
provide opportunities for spiritual growth. How might 
this be possible in an academic environment? Issues of 
faith are nurtured as much, if not more so, by the 
questions that faith raises, and not merely by the historic 
creedal or confessional answers that faith has 
traditionally given. Indeed, the very transmission of faith 
has been sustained by the questions generated by the 
faithful. Hence, one should agree with former St. Olaf 
College president Mark Edwards that "there should be in 
most cases no substantive difference between scholarship 
by Christians and by non-Christians." However, one can 
assume that the pedagogy at church-related campuses at 
times might be markedly different from that at secular 
campuses, since the church-related community of 
scholars will expect and encourage questions about 
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various disciplines, methods, and subject matters that 
might address faith or be addressed by faith. In church­
related colleges, a confessional tradition meets the wider 
world of scholarship: this encounter mixes not the 
ingredients of oppression or repression, but of lively 
debate. Of course, one should not assume that religion 
courses required for the baccalaureate degree by many 
Evangelical Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) 
schools will guarantee that faith and learning will be 
cross-fertilized. As an academic discipline, the study of 
religion in a church-related school may be done, indeed 
perhaps often ought to be done, from a vantage point of 
critical distance from faith, a "second order" reflection on 
"first order" faith propositions. However, such critical 
distance should never quiet questions of faith for the very 
sake of achieving an alleged "academic freedom" in the 
classroom. There is no wholly neutral stance in which 
scholars do their work. Scholars are always framed by 
traditions or perspectives. In a church-related 
environment, questions and issues of faith are, ironically, 
a guarantee of the pursuit of academic freedom across the 
curriculum, since they are not dismissed out of hand due 
to secularistic bias. 
The integration of faith and learning can happen and 
often occurs in the outreach programs of campus ministry 
centers at state and/or secular universities and colleges or 
by various groups within currently demarcated research 
arms of the academy. However, church-related colleges 
ought to endeavor to bring faith and learning into 
conversation in an intentional way in their many 
endeavors and venues. From the perspective of 
democratic ideals and free inquiry, such a goal in no way 
jeopardizes the autonomy or academic freedom of faculty 
or students, since all members of a church-related 
academic community have freely consented to the value 
of this endeavor by their joining this particular 
community of scholars. Hence, as suggested by 
Ricoeur' s thinking, the atmosphere that ought to be 
fostered on church-related campuses would avoid, on the 
one hand, a skepticism that thinks that it is pointless to 
seek truth or, in this case, the integration of faith and 
learning, and, on the other hand, a dogmatism in which 
one presumes to have discovered the definitive truth so 
that no further questions need be asked.2 Rather, church­
related higher education can foster an attitude of 
hopefulness that faith can provide a vision of meaning, 
meaningfulness, and even truth in and for the academy as 
it inspires students to consider lives of dedicated service 
to the world. Church-related higher education ought to 
produce graduates who understand the responsibilities of 
dual citizenship in both Athens and Jerusalem. The 
skeptic needs to take the risk of questing for meaning in 
inherited symbols, despite these symbol's limitations, 
while the dogmatist needs to see his or her symbols 
appropriately critiqued. 
The Lutheran Approach to Christian Higher 
Education 
As several scholars have argued, different Christian 
traditions have tended to construe the relationship 
between faith and learning in different ways. 3 The 
Reformed tradition has tended to integrate faith and 
learning by subordinating learning to faith in order to 
construct a unified and coherent single understanding of 
reality, a purported "Christian worldview" since, after all, 
all truth is God's truth. A consistent Reformed position 
tends to be alarmed by the threat of secularization, since 
it will attribute secularization as resistance to the 
distinctive Christian perspective.4 The Roman Catholic 
perspective tends to emphasize continuity between faith 
and reason since it is apt to construe the material world in 
virtually a "sacramental" way as a vehicle of God's grace 
and presence. The Mennonite and/or "free church" 
traditions emphasize not so much a distinctive Christian 
understanding of the world as distinctive Christian 
behavior-radical discipleship--a personal, practical, 
and unique discipline as over against the world. While 
appreciating the desire to relate faith and learning found 
in all these approaches and, in fact, sensing a core of truth 
in all of them, Lutheran higher education resists the 
attempt to impose a "Christian worldview" on the world, 
or the desire to insulate itself from the world, or the 
supposition that there is an uncontested continuum 
between faith and learning. Perhaps less confident in our 
ability to interpret either our world or God's truth for the 
world than these other perspectives, Lutheran higher 
education tends to see its mission as establishing a 
dialogue between faith and learning for the sake of 
mentoring citizens who will serve both church and 
society. The integration of faith and learning in a 
Lutheran perspective, then, suggests thematizing a 
conversation between the implications of faith for 
learning and the implications of the various disciplines in 
the arts and sciences for faith, when and where it is 
appropriate. 
A conversation between faith and learning should not be 
misconstrued as one between public (learning) and 
private matters (faith issues). It is not an exercise in 
"values clarification." Rather, it involves the "to and fro" 
or "give and take" movement in a dialogue generated by 
two sets of possibilities: those of new life granted by the 
gospel as they bear upon the life of the mind, and those of 
the life of the mind as they bear upon our comprehension 
of the gospel. A Lutheran approach to higher education 
is guided by an affinnation that the world is properly 
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God's, not our own, and that this truth liberates us from 
any pretentiousness towards divinity that we might foster. 
As people of faith, we can be free to accept our 
creatureliness, our ultimate dependence upon God as a 
loving creator. As people of faith, we can be free from 
the anxiety that can cause humans to be "curved in" upon 
themselves, as Luther put it. Indeed, we can be liberated 
from our own quest for self-security and in this way we 
are available to consider the needs of our neighbors and 
the earth. Hence, people ought not to insulate their faith 
from the challenges and prospects of the world, since the 
gospel frees them to accept their creatureliness in and for 
the world. We also ought to be suspicious of any 
attempts to impose a "Christian worldview" on the world 
since we can never assume, this side of the eschaton, that 
our faith can somehow become sight. We walk, as St. 
Paul puts it, "by faith, not by sight" (2 Cor. 5:7). Faith 
indeed should seek to understand everything it is capable 
of understanding. Faith is seeking understanding, as St. 
Augustine taught us. Indeed, St. Augustine is right to 
note that far from faith making one blind, it is rather on 
account of faith that one can see or understand anything 
at all. However, furthering Augustinian thinking about 
the relationship between faith and understanding, Luther 
contended that genuine faith is bereft of empirical 
measuring. Indeed, faith must be content to find God 
under the "sign of the opposite," in suffering and the 
cross,5 rather than in security or triumphalistic glory, with 
which reason might feel more secure. Guided by a 
healthy suspicion in the ability of the power of human 
reason to determine or share a common home ground 
with divine truth as such, since it is vulnerable to the 
onslaught of the "labyrinthine depths of human self­
deception,"6 a Lutheran understanding of the gospel 
naturally can affirm dialogue as the best model for the 
relating or integrating of faith and learning, since 
dialogue especially can accommodate the ambiguity, or 
the lack of sight, that genuine faith must accept even as it 
seeks to make sense of its world. 
While historically the Lutheran tradition has tended to be 
"quietistic" with regard to the economic, political, and 
social "powers that be" that operate in the created order, 
and has rightly been chastised for this social passivity, 
there are certainly enough theological resources and 
leverages within Lutheranism, were Lutheranism to 
challenge its quietistic heritage. These powers are 
susceptible to self-serving incurvation, our tendency, as 
Luther put it, to be turned in upon ourselves. They 
should not be uncritically trusted. These powers can be 
instruments that further God's good creation, when they 
help us to focus on the needs of our neighbors or the 
earth. Nevertheless, they also are capable of systemic 
distortions when they become self-serving. With regard 
to education, Lutherans can especially walk freely 
because they know that education is not, and can never 
be, salvific. While education can help sustain social 
health, it can also be a vehicle of systemic distortions or 
social "incurvation." It is the gospel alone, then, that 
justifies the ungodly, not the processes or outcomes of 
education. From a Lutheran perspective, education does 
its job best when it directs us away from ourselves and 
toward the needs of our neighbors and the earth. 
Lutheran higher education holds out the prospect of being 
guided by awe and wonder towards the creation, rather 
than the fierce attempt to control nature for human's own 
purposes. We are, as Robert Jenson has nicely phrased it, 
to be gardeners of someone else's (i. e., God's) garden 
(Jenson 113). 
The wider academic context in the twentieth century has 
not always been amenable to the cultivation of a 
conversation between Athens and Jerusalem. The 
"liberal-rationalist" tradition, as Richard Baepler has 
designated it, has looked to the scientific method alone as 
a norm for authority and has configured the purpose of 
higher education to be primarily pragmatic in outlook. It 
discredits the role of faith in public matters; faith, then, is 
relegated to private matters. Lutheran higher education 
has responded in different ways to this academic 
tradition. The Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod 
(LCMS) schools, it could be argued, have generally opted 
for a "sectarian" strategy that rejects many, if not most, 
aspects of this tradition out of hand. ELCA schools, 
perhaps, have in various degrees and ways tended to 
accommodate this tradition. Much is to be learned from 
the liberal-rationalist tradition.7 We should affirm the use 
of scientific method and the important contributions that 
an individual's creative self-expression in the academy 
can offer the world. However, the overall record of the 
liberal-rationalist tradition is ethically ambiguous and 
some aspects of its outlook on the world are incompatible 
with the Christian gospel. The liberal-rationalist tradition 
rejects external authority and tradition, and affirms a 
"common rationality" that presumes that objectivity 
belongs solely to mathematics and the "hard sciences" of 
physics, chemistry, and possibly biology. It tends to 
reduce questions of truth to matters only of verification 
within the confines of controlled inquiry and 
demonstration. Since the attempt to specify an 
overarching common good is unobtainable to scientific 
pursuit, the liberal-rationalist tradition fosters a highly 
individualistic social policy. The self is "free" for any 
number of ends as long as it does not limit the autonomy 
for others. This tradition has altered the terrain for the 
kind of education offered in "denominational colleges," 
such as Lutheran schools which, as established in the 
nineteenth century, encouraged students to consider the 
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unity of knowledge, human moral purpose, societal 
leadership, and the classics of the West (Baepler 48). For 
the liberal-rationalist heritage, Athens and Jerusalem 
should not be in dialogue. Why? When seen as affecting 
the public, faith threatens to constrain the autonomous 
self. Furthermore, faith-lacking scientific verification­
is viewed by those espousing this tradition as largely an 
irrational matter. 
In an era of increasing pluralism, the hegemony of the 
liberal-rationalist tradition is less secure today than, say, 
twenty or thirty years ago. However, it is still a 
widespread and powerful social stance in the academy 
and it is fueled by the conviction that both scientific 
method as a path to truth (as opposed to "superstition") 
and personal autonomy ( as opposed to the heteronomy of 
hierarchical churchly and political authority) need to be 
preserved. Surely, the insight that this tradition offers for 
faith is that genuine faith must be on guard lest it become 
either superstitious or oppressively authoritarian. 
However, many scholars have rightly challenged a 
"verificationist" approach to truth that tends to pit science 
against faith. Indeed, the humanities are relegated to 
mere "taste" (about which, as the saying goes, there is no 
dispute) from the perspective of "verificationism." While 
verificationism has been widely discredited by many 
thinkers, in The Outrageous Idea of Christian 
Scholarship, George Marsden helpfully designates four 
specific objections to it. Since the liberal-rationalist 
tradition continues to wield considerable force in the 
academy, it is worthwhile to present Marsden's four 
points. First, the reliance on empirical scientific models 
as the specific criteria for truth is simply misguided since 
empirical science is not competent to provide definitive 
answers to the larger questions of life, which we should 
not assume to be properly configured as wholly 
subjective issues. Second, the conviction that all 
academic beliefs must be empirically based is 
inconsistent, a double-standard; "it [the empirical 
criterion] is not applied consistently to other 
nondemonstrable beliefs that play prominent roles in the 
secular academy." For instance, most academics believe 
in the value of equal treatment for all people regardless of 
gender or race. However, such a belief cannot be derived 
from scientific argument. Third, religious beliefs cannot 
be excluded from the academy since many "academics 
are religious" and their beliefs will inevitably shape some 
of their scholarship. And, finally, verificationism unduly 
favors scholarship based on purely naturalistic 
presuppositions. Scientific method has been widely 
successful in much of the natural sciences. It, however, is 
not itself scientifically self-verifying. 
In some perspectives, the liberal-rationalist approach to 
higher education may be less ethically neutral or innocent 
than it would lead us to believe. Indeed, as Max Weber 
conceived the goal of the university from its perspective, 
the university should seek mastery of the world through 
calculation and control (Schwehn 58). That goal, from 
the traditional Lutheran perspective, ought to be 
challenged. It would be tantamount to ambitatio 
divinitatis, the attempt of humanity to be its own god for 
itself. It is the exact opposite of living by faith. The 
results of our attempts at world mastery have 
consequences for the overall health of the planet as well 
as social, economic, and political inequities between rich 
and poor. ELCA schools can offer society far more by 
examining and challenging these aspects of the liberal­
rationalist tradition. Some aspects of this tradition, such 
as promoting free inquiry, are helpful and consistent with 
the mission of ELCA-related higher education. However, 
other aspects, such as its inherent individualism, run 
counter to the goals of ELCA higher education. 
Individualism undermines the attempt to develop a 
concern for vocational service to church, neighbor, and 
the earth. 
Ricoeur's Hermeneutics of Suspicion and Retrieval: A 
Challenge to the Liberal-Rationalist Tradition8 
The need for church-related higher education to move 
beyond the confines of the liberal-rationalist tradition 
motivates the concern of this paper to investigate and 
present the hermeneutical phenomenology of Paul 
Ricoeur (born 1913), and to draw out the implications of 
his philosophy for Lutheran higher education. Since the 
liberal-rationalist tradition is unsuited to provide a 
dialogical encounter between faith and learning for which 
Lutheranism quests, it then behooves us to seek an 
alternative model for education. Ricoeur is not an 
educational philosopher. Nevertheless, Ricoeur's 
development of a reflexive philosophy that seeks to 
interpret or rehear symbols, myths, and texts in terms of 
susp1c1on and retrieval, or "distanciation" and 
"appropriation," provides a model of dialogue with these 
symbols, myths, and texts, harmonious with and 
illustrative of how Lutheran higher education as itself 
dialogical can be construed. In Ricoeur' s work, issues of 
faith are seen as public matters, offering plausible 
perspectives on human identity, the nature of the good, 
and the nature of the world. Developed within a modem 
perspective, Ricoeur's work indicates that modernity 
need not entail secularity. Furthermore, Ricoeur's 
thinking unmasks a darker side to secularism that should 
not be ignored. This section of this essay will offer an in­
depth study of the development of Ricoeur' s approach to 
symbol, myth, metaphor, and narrative in order to reclaim 
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a space for the construal of faith and learning as 
dialogical, public, and worthwhile. 
Ricoeur' s hermeneutics grew out of his work as a 
reflexive philosopher working within the French 
phenomenological tradition; Ricoeur saw the role of 
philosophy as offering possibilities of an increased self­
understanding linked to the questions of a meaningful life 
and action. While himself a French Reformed Christian, 
he bracketed issues of faith in his philosophical pursuits 
in order to protect the integrity of both philosophy and 
theology.9 For Ricoeur, philosophy should not be an 
apologetic handmaid to theology, and theology should 
feel its freedom to position itself with relation to 
philosophy as it sees fit. His approach offered a self­
critique of the Reformed perspective on relating faith and 
reason, since he was not seeking to establish a Christian 
"worldview." Similar to the Lutheran position presented 
earlier, Ricoeur's work implies that faith offers 
philosophy not a worldview but a critical engagement 
upon its assumptions, methods, and intentions. Faith may 
be able to accommodate diachronically and perhaps 
synchronically a number of worldviews, but not every 
world view. The standard of testing a world view for 
Lutherans in light of Ricoeur' s views ought to be whether 
or not a given worldview is compatible with the 
cruciform existence of Christian discipleship, one which 
seeks to honor God above all things and seeks the 
neighbor's and the earth's well-being. An analysis of 
Ricoeur's intellectual journey, as we shall see, helps 
illustrate an intellectual basis for the viability of a 
dialogical approach to faith and learning, and how faith 
issues are genuinely public. 
The key to understanding Ricoeur' s view of dialogue is 
his analysis of a modem appropriation of mythical and 
symbolic thinking. Some modems tend to ridicule myth, 
but for Ricoeur myths hold the secret to some aspects of 
human experience, if we are willing to engage them 
dialogically. Early in his career, Ricoeur sought to 
extend the thinking of his teacher Edmund Husserl 10 by 
producing a phenomenological description of the human 
will.11 In order to attain the phenomenological standard 
of "pure description" or a transparency between the will 
s such and our conception of the will, Ricoeur initially 
··· acketed the experiences of fault and transcendence.
hen he undertook to study the notions of fallibility and
. It, however, he acknowledged the limitations of
ilsserl's approach to explain these phenomena.12 The
: usserlian perspective was far more comfortable with
Qtions like motives, powers, conditions, and limits
er than understanding how human fallibility is
pable of moving to fault. Ricoeur concluded that the
hdition of fallibility is due to the fact that for humans it
is difficult, if not impossible, to establish a proportion 
between desires and ends, or freedom and finitude. 
However, he determined that in order to understand fault, 
phenomenology needs to appeal to and then interpret the 
mythical tales of the origins of evil that pre-scientific 
peoples devised. 
In The Symbolism of Evil, Ricoeur explored various 
myths that sought to interpret the origin of evil such as 
"primordial chaos," "primeval fall," "original 
defilement," "exile from paradise," and "tragic fate," 
culminating in the affirmation of a "servile will." In 
Ricoeur's view, such myths ironically were the attempt to 
make sense of something inherently irrational, the 
phenomenon of evil. Ricoeur' s insight was that finally it 
is only myth that can help us attempt to provide 
categories for philosophical reflection about evil. 
Ricoeur concluded that myth is a species of symbol-an 
extended or "narrated" symbol. Following Rudolf 
Bultmann13 but likewise much of modem thinking about 
mythology, he argued that myth must loose its 
explanatory pretension or presumed "etiological 
function." Nevertheless, Ricoeur contended that the 
quest to "demythologize" should not be to deprive us of 
myth, but instead to rid it of a "false logos" (Symbolism
of Evil 162), the illusion of offering a kind of crude 
"science." In this way, myth can thus affirm its 
exploratory significance, "its power of discovering and 
revealing the bond between man and what he considers 
sacred" (5). Or, as he stated it, ''The dissolution of the 
myth as explanation is the necessary way to the 
restoration of the myth as symbol" (350). Hence, in 
contrast to Husserlian phenomenology, meaning is not 
limited to the cognitive and empirical modes of 
understanding; it is rather profoundly hermeneutical, 14 an 
attempt to "listen" to the dimensions of experience that 
would, without myth or symbol, be "closed and hidden." 
Since much human behavior is symbolically construed, 
Ricoeur' s work opens vistas for philosophical and literary 
inquiry that are either closed or limited when we focus 
solely on concepts alone (as does Idealism) or sensations 
alone (as does Empiricism) to help us understand reality. 
Ricoeur contended that far from being irrational, as many 
in the liberal-rationalist tradition might claim, symbols 
provoke us to think. How are they capable of doing this? 
They do this because they are many-layered or 
"polysemic." For example, the symbol "defilement" 
conveys both a literal and a figurative connotation. The 
latter, an analogy, where defilement is like stain or spot, 
encourages our attempt to decipher just how similar in 
any given judgment the analogy holds. Hence, as 
Ricoeur so famously noted, "the symbol gives rise to 
thought." This is because the attempt to decipher 
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symbols is a thoroughly interpretive or hermeneutical 
enterprise. Ricoeur affirmed that the critical moment of 
modern thinking (the heart of the liberal-rationalist 
tradition) is a necessary and indispensable aspect of 
humanity's process of intellectual maturation. We have 
indeed "come of age," as Dietrich Bonhoeffer taught. 
However, we are not limited solely to the resources of 
this age. We can, and indeed should, "critique the 
critique" by recognizing modernity's limits and its 
tendency to inhibit our full understanding of reality or the 
exercising of our full range of human inquiry. Myth and 
symbol can continue to speak to us, if we are willing to 
listen to them. Hence, Ricoeur described the 
hermeneutical enterprise as a "wager"-a risk that pre­
modern symbols can still address us, disclose truth to us, 
and reveal possibilities of new experiences for us, despite 
the fact that they die as causal explanations for things 
(351). In this light, he claimed that it is not possible for 
us moderns to return, like pre-scientific peoples, to a 
"primitive naivete." However, by interpreting these 
symbols, we can hear their truths again. 
Ricoeur concluded that hermeneutics involves a circular 
process that can be thematized as: "We must understand 
in order to believe, but we must believe in order to 
understand." Faith will wager or risk the possibility that 
the symbol can still address the human by disclosing 
meanings that can help humans position themselves with 
regard to their relation in the cosmos and even to the 
sacred. Hermeneutics, in a sense, is an act of faith, 
though a kind of "secular" and not a specifically religious 
faith.15 It clearly is never a "blind faith." Rather, it is
more a faith like St. Augustine's who claims that apart 
from faith one cannot see. Symbols, then, encourage us 
to think as we attempt to decipher their meanings for 
people today.16 But thought also returns us back to the 
symbol, because we inescapably live within symbol 
systems. There is no metaphysical or scientific "second 
order" discourse that can dispense with the symbolic and 
mythic "first order" discourse. Since Ricoeur 
acknowledged that symbols can legitimate and sustain 
oppressive social systems, he listened carefully to the 
"masters of suspicion" such as Marx, Nietzsche, and 
Freud who unmasked idols used to justify social 
repression or inequities. Such idols must be smashed in 
order to allow symbols to speak (Freud and Philosophy 
532). An appropriate way in which to communicate to 
others about the truth of a symbol is then "attestation," 
which for Ricoeur has become the hermeneutical 
equivalent of certitude in other disciplines ( Oneself as 
Another 21). The upshot here for Lutheran higher 
education is that Ricoeur' s work allows a space for 
reflection to open about faith without the liberal­
rationalistic bias that faith is inherently non-cognitive. 
Ricoeur' s move from Husserlian phenomenology to 
hermeneutics, giving a public status to myth as an 
unavoidable symbolic form of human self-understanding 
and communication, provides a forum for faith matters to 
position certain aspects of human life, such as freedom, 
sin, origins, and destiny. It also suggests that the human 
quest for truth involved in asking these questions is 
meaningful, even though these questions transcend our 
finite ability to achieve definitive answers. In Lutheran 
terms, the purpose of education as dialogue is not to 
foster the life of the mind for its own sake but is guided 
by the possibility of nurturing a self-dispossessing life of 
discipleship. The primary symbol of the cross, in the 
Lutheran understanding, calls people to challenge idols 
which they invent in order to gain security and a false 
view of the self in which the self owns itself, and to live 
"outside themselves" in God and for the sake of the 
neighbor. 
Truth as Manifestation 
Having moved into hermeneutics, Ricoeur must 
undertake the difficult task of better understanding the 
ability of language to refer to extra-linguistic reality. For 
Ricoeur, truth is to be found as manifestation and not 
merely correspondence. Ricoeur inquired into the 
question of truth in language by investigating the 
semantic structure of referentiality in metaphor and 
narrative.17 In order to clarify his stance on language as 
referential, Ricoeur appealed to Gottlob Frege's linguistic 
distinction between "sense" and "reference." "Sense" 
semiotically conveys the intra-linguistic dimension of 
language-how words are to be distinguished from each 
other in the intelligibility of a sentence as such. The 
"reference," however, is the semantic dimension of 
language that indeed refers to extra-linguistic possibilities 
for human living in the world. Referentiality should no 
longer be construed, as the Structuralists conceived it, as 
solely an interplay among various signs within a text, nor 
as the Romantics construed it, as a reader's reproduction 
of an author's intentions. Instead, the text refers to 
reality by disclosing possible new horizons of experience 
for a reader.18 From this perspective, truth is radically 
reconceived, similar to the views of Martin Heidegger19 
and Hans-Georg Gadamer,20 as no longer an equivalence 
between an image in the mind and reality as such but as a 
disclosure of possible ways of living or new horizons of 
experience. 21 
Emphasizing the impqrtance of discourse as the avenue 
to truth-as-manifestation, Ricoeur' s work naturally turned 
in the mid-1970s through the mid-1980s to the question 
of narrative, particularly toward the question of 
establishing a relationship between narrative and time.22 
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For Ricoeur, time is to be construed narratively as human 
time and narrative is to be construed as temporal 
experience. He isolated three hermeneutical moments to 
narrative: prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration. 
Our ability to prefigure our world means that we 
approach life with a preunderstanding of what human 
acting and communication are. Our ability to configure 
our world is our ability to "emplot," the act of "eliciting a 
pattern from a succession," that is, to configure episodic 
and unrelated temporal events into a meaningful totality. 
It is the text, not the reader, who projects a world and 
thus enlarges the reader.23 Our ability to re.figure our 
world is the ability to decipher the ethical possibilities in 
a situation suggested by the text. Education, from a 
Ricoeurian perspective, ought to be seen as itself a 
profoundly hermeneutical process as it exposes students 
to various traditions and canons of critical inquiry. 
Clearly, we can also infer from Ricoeur's hermeneutics 
that faith is capable of bearing on public matters by 
disclosing possibilities for how to reconfigure life in light 
of faith in the gospel and love towards one's neighbor. 
Truth is insight into the world and human relations, into 
new directions for human life, and into discerning God's 
will for humans; this reconception of truth parallels the 
Lutheran view of education both as dialogical, open to 
new horizons of experience, and as humble with regard to 
our attempts to comprehend reality. It also implies for 
Christians, in light of the power of the God who justifies 
the ungodly, the possibility of serving in new practices of 
charity in one's vocation on behalf of others and the 
earth. 
Ricoeur as Interpreter of Religion as a Dimension of 
Human Experience 
Ricoeur worked from within a "secular" framework. He 
did not see himself as a Christian apologist. Indeed, he 
bracketed issues of faith. Nevertheless, he criticized 
secularistic assumptions that tend to trivialize faith or 
actually repress questions of faith. His quest to retrieve 
questions and issues of mystery and myth was solely for 
the sake of unleashing the possibility of a more human 
and more humane humanity, a possibility which is 
lessened when the religious dimension to human 
experience is repressed or ignored. 24 In an important 
.article "Manifestation and Proclamation," he lamented 
that modernity "is constituted as modem precisely by 
:having moved beyond the sacred cosmos" (61). Hence, 
· �Modem persons no longer have a sacred space, a center,
templum, a holy mountain, or an axis mundi. Their
xistence is decentered, eccentric, a-centered."25 The
mifications of our domestication of nature and our de­
ystification of it through our adoption of scientific
ethod and our ubiquitous use of technology (the "real 
metaphysics of the twentieth century,"26 as Ernst Jilnger 
phrased it), is that "we no longer participate in a cosmos, 
but we now have a universe as the object of thought and 
as a matter to be exploited."27 It is the exposure of this 
hidden ideology of exploitation laden in much scientific 
and technological pursuit that led Ricoeur to note: "this 
same consideration ought to lead us to call into question 
the judgment modernity passes on what it makes appear 
as an archaism. This judgment in its tum has already 
begun to be judged itself. Modernity is neither a fact nor 
our destiny. It is henceforth an open question."28 
In a sense, for Ricoeur, the nature of the human is neither 
fully nor properly expressed apart from some kind of 
acknowledgment of the sacred. Technology's de­
mystification of the cosmos results not only in the "death 
of God," as it was expressed in the rnid-1960s, but also in 
the death of humanity. This is the darker side of 
secularity, which needs greater acknowledgement in the 
academy. When the participants in the universe are 
reduced to combinations of impersonal, albeit 
interconnected machinery, it is not only the universe as 
mysterious that dies, but also humanity as uniquely self­
transcendent. Humanity is properly self-constituted only 
within the horizon of mystery, wonder, awe, and joy, and 
certain human events such as births, deaths, or corning of 
age, are so evocative of both wonder and threat that only 
religious ritualization offers an etiquette that rightly 
responds to these mysteries. Ricoeur retrieved a sense of 
mystery to the cosmos by means of affirming the 
exploratory nature of myth, and the meaning-producing 
patterns of metaphor and narrative in order to help 
provide tools for better understanding our humanity and 
to critique the one-dimensional aspect of human interest 
that technology suggests. He also believed that while 
talk of faith is not susceptible to empirical testing (faith 
after all does not become sight)-nevertheless it is 
capable of being rationally configured. Like Immanuel 
Kant, Ricoeur was convinced that matters of faith can be 
thought, even if they can not be known. Far from 
violating one's personal autonomy, faith retrieves the 
possibility of allowing the human to be seen in non­
reductionist terms as personal and meaningful. For 
Ricoeur, the attempt to discern possible horizons of 
experience from a symbol or a text is a risk, a hope that 
being-as-such will or can give meaning to one's life by 
venturing or wagering that life-altering possibilities can 
be offered or given by the text or the symbol. Both the 
skeptic and the dogmatist short-circuit the possibility of 
hope because they think they can bring closure to the 
discussion prematurely. Neither position genuinely 
represents a stance of faith. However, a faith which can 
embrace questions, even doubts, fulfills our humanity and 
allows us to become ever more human in relation to God, 
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others, and our own very selves. Hopefully, a Lutheran 
understanding of the gospel in the context of higher 
education affirms this truth. 
The Contours and Value of Dialogue 
What then are the contours or texture of dialogue for 
Ricoeur? How can Athens and Jerusalem be in dialogue, 
if this is indeed what the dual citizen of Lutheran higher 
education desires? Ricoeur stresses that we need to 
check our modem anti-mythic assumptions and learn that 
some issues can only be understood mythically. We 
need, in other words, to take the risk of challenging 
ourselves and listening to the voice of the other in the 
myth. Likewise, Ricoeur teaches us to think through the 
new possible patterns of life suggested by various 
symbols. Symbols push us towards a "give and take" 
relationship between the other and ourselves. Narrative, 
for Ricoeur, asks us how our lives might be refigured in 
light of a story, implying a kind of attitude of open­
endedness as we inquire how a text may alter our lives. It 
seems, then, that there are four crucial components to a 
phenomenology of dialogue on the basis of our 
investigation of Ricoeur' s hermeneutics and theory of 
narrative: risk, listening, mutuality (give and take), and 
open-endedness. These four are not to be understood in 
either a temporal or a hierarchical sequence. However, 
they do represent the phenomenological contours or 
texture of authentic dialogue. First, when interpreters 
approach a text or a symbol they must take the risk in 
hopefulness and faith to venture that this symbol can 
indeed continue to speak. The symbol of course may in 
some sense deceive. The symbol or text may, for 
instance, authorize or legitimate repression. Ricoeur 
would have us test or question this of the symbol or text. 
It may provide some kind of "false logos" that would 
seek to explain reality in a quasi-scientific way. He 
would have us challenge our assumptions about the 
symbol or text. We need to be suspicious and yet hopeful 
of retrieval as we undergo our suspicion. The hermeneut 
falls short of certitude, yet not of thought. Second, the 
hermeneut is a listener. Hermeneutics allows the symbol 
or text to question us, to challenge us, to provoke us, to 
permit us to question and test our deepest convictions and 
assumptions. It is risky business indeed! It is an 
interplay between exclusion and embrace, distance and 
closeness, suspicion and retrieval, skepticism and 
attestation. It is in this way that we listen to the text or 
symbol-even as we question it. We ask: How might it 
refigure our lives and make us different or hold out new 
possibilities for us? Third, the fact that we stand between 
suspicion and retrieval and reject both skepticism and 
dogmatism guarantees that our task of interpretation, our 
analysis of the possibilities of life reconfigured by the 
text or symbol, will be a process of mutual give and take, 
and hence, fourth, an open-endedness due to the "surplus 
of meaning" in a text. Demythologization does not have 
to lead to demystification or demythication. Indeed, even 
scientific method in Ricoeur' s perspective, should be 
understood as likewise a hermeneutical task, the 
interpretation of data and experience in light of models 
which attempt a "critical realism," a possible, imaginative 
way of representing the world. Ricoeur, like C. S. Lewis, 
teaches Christians to affirm the mythic character of their 
primary narratives. Gary Dorrien, interpreting Lewis 
says, "If the Christ myth is true in the way that it claims 
to be true, it stands to other myths as the fulfillment of 
their promise and truth. It is not an illustration of mythic 
truth, but the ground of its possibility and the realization 
of its fragmentary glimpse of the Real"29 In this regard, 
Lutherans need, at times, to look to the work of Thomas 
Aquinas as a model in the art of Christian dialogue. 
While risking his own faith by bearing the brunt of some 
incompatible aspects of Aristotelianism with orthodox 
Christian faith, Aquinas was also able to discern various 
degrees of truth in Aristotle that he believed Christians 
must appropriate. Likewise, contemporary Christians 
will look to thinkers as diverse as Stephen Hawking and 
the Buddha in their quest for truth, even though these 
thinkers will challenge Christian faith while giving great 
insights about life and the world. 
What then does Ricoeur have to teach us about the value 
of dialogue for church-related education? In Ricoeur's 
perspective, issues of faith can engage the public arena; 
they are no longer positioned by the "liberal-rationalist" 
tradition. A dialogical approach to faith deals with public 
matters by allowing scholars to reflect on religious 
symbols and narratives with an eye to their impact upon 
public life. In the context of the church-related college, 
this discussion allows for how Christian narratives might 
suggest new horizons of interpreting experience. It 
should be clear that dialogue about matters of faith and 
public life sometimes takes the voice of argument and 
criticism. For both Lutherans and Ricoeurians, the 
Christian scholar must often internalize important 
criticisms of the Christian tradition made from outside 
the tradition and seek to defend or revise the stance of 
Christian faith. However, at other times, both Lutherans 
and Ricoeurians recognize that the Christian scholar must 
unmask secularity as itself offering an alternative faith 
stance in opposition to and certainly no more justifiable 
than Christianity. With dialogue, the Christian scholar 
will seek to be as charitable as possible to the stances of 
the non-Christian and extra-theological disciplines. Even 
ethicists, in a sense, can teach chemistry, since the 
attitudes they express about the discipline of chemistry 
and how chemicals are best used offer important ideas for 
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students to wrestle with. Since Christian scholars 
recognize the world as God's world, even though this 
truth is not universally acknowledged, they will seek to 
build as many bridges as are possible with non-Christian 
faith stances and extra-theological disciplines. They will 
risk, listen, seek mutuality, and open-endedness in their 
quest. Some features of the Christian perspective, 
however, will remain non-negotiable in this discussion. 
Christians might deliberate about how to accomplish 
practices of peace in the world. However, they will not 
debate the truth that peace is a goal that ought to be 
achieved. In the Lutheran perspective, the scholar as a 
Christian disciple will build such bridges between 
disciplines and amongst people in order to be Christ to 
and serve the "neighbor" in the context of the academy. 
Both accomodationist and sectarian strategies towards 
modernity short circuit dialogue, since they tend to 
collapse the dialogue to a monologue, over-prioritizing 
only one voice of the conversation. Lutheran higher 
education will be best served when it charts a path 
between these extremes. Lutheran higher education can 
fulfill this task because it expresses the freedom. to 
transgress boundaries established by Weberian 
orthodoxies in the academy. Instead of favoring the 
Weberian prioritization of instrumental reason and its 
concomitant "fact-value" split, the pedagogy of Lutheran 
higher education will sustain itself by raising those 
irrepressible questions about human destiny, purpose, and 
service to God and neighbor. 
Conclusion 
Again, why should the church support institutions of 
higher learning? How can the church fulfill its mission 
through them? We might be tempted to think that the 
attempt to establish a "Christian worldview" would be 
the best answer to this question. However, following 
both Luther's and Ricoeur' s thinking, it is clear that 
simply because a scholar uses "Christian" data or 
attempts to devise a "Christian" method for seeking truth, 
a "Christian" worldview is not guaranteed. However, is 
not the attempt to establish such a worldview 
presumptuous, in light of the gospel? Our faith will 
· · become sight at the eschaton-but only at the eschaton.
This side of eternity, we need to be very humble in how 
we relate faith to learning. Our construction of models of 
reality, even within theology, fail isomorphically to 
correspond to reality. The Lutheran position of 
attempting to establish a dialogue between faith and 
learning honors the ambiguity that men and women of 
faith actually experience in their current pilgrimage. 
Nevertheless, worldviews will be constructed, especially 
within the academy. Christians should join in the task of 
building them. To the conversation, they will bring a 
"discretion of spirits" (1 John 4: l); they will raise 
questions of how the ultimate or God is named and 
served, how the neighbor's needs are met, and how 
stewardship of the earth is best done. The Lutheran quest 
to establish this dialogue is a vigorously Christian, albeit 
a humble, endeavor. The Lutheran educational insights 
that ( l) dialogue between faith and learning is an 
appropriate endeavor, (2) the world can be affirmed as an 
arena of creative, spiritual activity, and (3) self-critique is 
important in all our activities, can be furthered as we 
have seen, by an encounter with Ricoeur' s hermeneutics 
of suspicion and retrieval, the plausibility of myth as 
disclosing truth, and the attempt to dialogue with the 
other. 
The Lutheran church 1s a confessional church. 
Throughout its symbolic writings we encounter the 
phrase "we believe, teach, and confess." In the school, 
the church risks her confessional heritage. She is willing 
to bracket it in order to listen to critiques and to discern 
how to engage the gospel with the life of the mind. This 
endeavor is a necessary venture, if Christians are to 
continue their earthly pilgrimage in faith in God and in 
service toward the neighbor. In the academy, the 
contemporary Christian is no different than Abraham 
who hears and obeys God's call, not knowing where he 
or she will arrive. This legacy is worth our while to 
transmit to our youth and also to model before the world. 
In light of the inroads of the liberal-rationalist tradition in 
ELCA schools, the challenge for many of our colleges 
will be to create a space for this unique dialogue to occur. 
One might well wager that those institutions which seek 
to retrieve this calling will find their academic journey 
adventurous, rewarding, and true to their calling. 
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Notes 
1 L. DeAne Lagerquist has shared with me the insight that for many Lutherans, the Lutheran tradition in higher education functions as
a compass that orients our outlook on the world and not a map that would seek a totalizing perspective. 
2 In his article "Philosophy and the Unity of Truth," Ricoeur claims "If all history engenders a degree of skepticism, every claim to 
truth fosters a degree of dogmaticism. From this point of view, history would only be a history of errors and truth would be the 
suspension of history." See History and Truth, trans. C. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), 42. 
3 The following discussion is dependent on Richard T. Hughes and William B. Adrian's Models for Christian Higher Education: 
Strategies for Success in the Twenty-First Century (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997). 
4 See Ernest L. Simmons, Lutheran Higher Education: An Introduction for Faculty (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1998), 31. 
5 Hence in The Bondage of the Will, trans. J. I. Packer and 0. R. Johnston (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1957), 101, Luther wrote, 
" . . .  faith's object is things not seen. That there may be room for faith, therefore, all that is believed must be hidden. Yet it is not 
hidden more deeply than under a contrary appearance of sight, sense and experience. Thus, when God quickens, He does so by killing; 
when he justifies, He does so by pronouncing guilty; when he carries up to heaven, he does so by bringing down to hell." Consider 
also Luther's 20th thesis of the Heidleberg Disputation: "He deserves to be called a theologian, however, who comprehends the 
visible and manifest things of God seen through suffering and the cross." 
6 See Richard Baepler, "Toward an Understanding of Lutheran Character in Higher Education" in The Lutheran Reader, ed. by Paul J. 
Contino and David Morgan (Valparaiso: Valparaiso University Press, 1999), 50. 
7 I am adapting the categories "sectarian" and "accomodationist" from Ronald Thiemann's categorization of strategies among 
churches for dealing with secular critique of religion from modernity. See his Religion in Public Life: A Delimma for Democracy 
(Washington: Georgetown University Press, 1996), 55. 8 I am grateful for Bruce Reichenbach' s perceptive critique of this section of this essay, which pushed me to connect with greater rigor
Ricoeur's approach to dialogue with that of Lutheran higher education. 
9 Hence, in Oneself as Another [trans. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992)] Ricoeur claims that "It 
will be observed that this asceticism of the argument, which marks, I believe, all my philosophical work, leads to a type of philosophy 
from which the actual mention of God is absent and in which the question of God, as a philosophical question, itself remains in a 
suspension that could be called agnostic" (24). He also argues, "The reference of biblical faith to a culturally contingent symbolic 
network requires that this faith assume its own insecurity, which makes it a chance happening transformed into a destiny by means of 
a choice constantly renewed, in the scrupulous respect of different choices. The dependence of the self on a word that strips it of its 
glory, all the while comforting its courage to be, delivers biblical faith from the temptation, which I am here calling 
cryptophilosophical, of taking over the henceforth vacant role of ultimate foundation" (25). He goes on to cite Eberhard Jungel's anti­
foundationalist approach to theology as a convincing and winsome theological method. 10 For an examination of Husserl's philosophy, see his Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce
Gibson (New York: Collier, 1962), Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), and Experience and Judgment: Investigations in a Genealogy of Logic, trans. James S. Churchill and Karl 
Americks (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973). 
11 See Ricoeur's Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, trans. E. V. Kobak (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1966). For studies of Ricoeur's thinking, see Don Ihde's Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), David Wood, ed. On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation (London: 1991), 
Charles E. Reagan, Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979), T. Peter Kemp and David 
Rasmussen, eds. The Narrative Path: The Later Works of Paul Ricoeur (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), David Klemm, The 
Hermeneutical Theory Of Paul Ricoeur: A Constructive Analysis (London: Bucknell University Press, 1983), and David Klemm and 
William Schweiker, eds. Meanings in Texts and Actions: Questioning Paul Ricoeur (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 
1993). 
12 See Fallible Man, trans. Charles A Kelbley (New York: Fordham University Press, 1986), xlii. 13 In "Preface to Bultmann," published in Essays on Biblical Interpretation, ed. Lewis S. Mudge (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980), 49-72,
Ricoeur criticizes Bultmann for jumping too quickly from kerygma to faith; one should not bypass the question of language's ability 
to reconfigure our lives. 
14 Ricoeur defined the task of the hermeneutics as twofold: "to reconstruct the internal dynamic of the text and to restore to the work 
its ability to project itself outside itself in the representation of a world that I could inhabit." See "On Interpretation" in From Text to 
Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II, trans. Kathleen Blarney and John B. Thompson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 
18. 15 Hence in Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, trans. Denis Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 28,
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Ricoeur concludes "The contrary of suspicion, I will say bluntly is faith. What faith? No longer, to be sure, the first faith of the simple 
soul, but rather the second faith of one who has engaged in hermeneutics, faith that has undergone criticism, postcritical faith." 
16 Here Ricoeur's Kantianism can be seen at its clearest. Ricoeur's notion of "symbols" is comparable to Kant's notion of "aesthetic 
ideas," ideas for which no concept is adequate. Kant describes this category in his Third Critique which, unlike the First Critique 
which deals with knowledge or the Second Critique which deals with desire, deals with judgment, specifically the attempt to establish 
regulative, a priori, non-constitutive principles that can help us understand both our aesthetic judgments and our teleological approach 
to nature. For Kant's discussion of "aesthetic ideas" see The Critique of Judgment, trans. J. H. Bernard (New York: Hafuer, 1951), 
157. 
17 In order to affirm a referential dynamic to language he countered the structuralist perspective on language, popular among French 
intellectuals during the mid-twentieth century. Structuralism reduced language to a finite system of signs whose significance is 
determined by differences among the signs themselves and not from the signs' ability to refer to extra-linguistic reality as such. 
Ricoeur was troubled that in the structuralist perspective language is no longer treated as a "form of life," as Ludwig Wittgenstein 
would call it, but as a "self-sufficient system of inner relationships." Ricoeur's major criticism of structuralism was that "Language is 
not a world of its own. It is not even a world. But because we are in the world, because we are affected by situations, and because we 
orient ourselves comprehensively in those situations, we have something to say, we have experience to bring to language." See 
Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1976), 20-21. 
18 As Ricoeur noted: "What has to be appropriated is the meaning of the text itself, conceived in a dynamic way as the direction of 
thought opened up by the text. In other words, what has to be appropriated is nothing other than the power of disclosing a world that 
constitutes the reference of the text." See Interpretation Theory, 92. 
19 According to Heidegger an artwork "sets up" a world. See ''The Origin of a Work of Art" in Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. 
Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper, 1971), 44. 20 Truth and Method (New York Continuum, 1975), 273.
21 Hence, Ricouer claims "Far from saying that a subject already mastering his own way of being in the world projects the a priori of 
his self-understanding on the text and reads it into the text, I say that interpretation is the process by which disclosure of new modes of 
being-or if you prefer Wittgenstein to Heidegger, of new forms of life-gives to the subject a new capacity for knowing himself. If the 
reference of the text is the project of a world, then it is not the reader who primarily projects himself. The reader rather is enlarged in 
his capacity of self-projection by receiving a new mode of being from the text itself." See Interpretation Theory, 94. Mark I. Wallace 
further clarifies Ricoeur's position on understanding with the statement that it "occurs in the to-and-fro dialogue between text and 
interpreter whenever the interpreter is willing to be put into question by the text and risk openness to the world of possibilities the text 
projects." See "Introduction" to Ricoeur's Figuring the Sacred: Religion, Narrative, and Imagination, trans. David Pellauer and ed. 
Mark I. Wallace (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 9. 
22 See his magisterial Time and Narrative, trans. Kathleen Blarney and David Pellauer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1984, 1984, 1988). 23 In his last major work, Oneself as Another, Ricoeur explores ethics from his narrative perspective. He argues that the question of
personal identity should be constructed as ipseity, the quest to give intelligibility to one's life by means of composing one's own 
narrative about the self and not idem, the notion of the self as same. Hence, the self is best seen as developed by means of dialectic 
between self and the other than the self. 24 See "Manifestation and Proclamation" in Figuring the Sacred. 25 Ibid.
26 See John Wilkinson's "Introduction" to Jacques Ellul's The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New York: Vintage, 
1964), ix. 
27 Ibid, 61-62. 
28 Ibid. 
29 See The Word as True Myth: Interpreting Modern Theology (Louisville: Westminster, 1997), 237. 
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Reflections on Lutheran Identity on Reformation Sunday 
Thomas W. Martin 
Stories of beginnings are, like the fields of force reaching 
out from the quantum void, vehicles of immense and 
superhuman power. Just as these fundamental physical 
forces, which although hidden away deep within the 
universe's subconscious, are capable of controlling the 
actions of galaxies and atoms, mythic stories reach from 
their primal vortices to exert their forces on our images of 
ourselves and our sense of order and purpose in the 
universe. The mythic casts within which we rehearse 
varied aspects of our always occurring beginnings give 
shape to life, purpose to action, meaning to living and, 
when shared by whole cultures or subcultures, sanction to 
social structures and mores. Such myths have been with 
us, as near as anthropologists can tell, since the 
beginning. From the Ennuma Elish to The Boston Tea 
Party such stories have served to legitimate identities and 
produce seemingly self-existent frames of reference by 
which we anchor our thinking and very existence. They 
also enable us to ignore or subsume the thinking, or even 
existence of those who differ from us. 
On Reformation Sunday as Lutherans we gather to 
rehearse our foundational myths. We tell the story, in 
narrative and abstract doctrine, which serves as the basis 
of our identities and provides the lens through which we 
view our God, our Church, and those around us. It is a 
story whose immense force in shaping our lives achieves 
an inertia in driving us, often unaware, toward the future. 
If we are to reflect critically on our Lutheran myths, to 
judge their power for good or ill, it is important first to 
note that it is innately human to see the speck in someone 
else's eye before noticing the log in one's own. The 
other's1 myth is always easily debunked, seen through. 
One's own myths stand as self-evidently true, opaque, 
obviously just the way things are. It has been easy for 
most Americans to see the foibles of Marxist economics. 
Yet a significant majority of us accept the myths of 
market driven consumer capitalism and its attendant 
economic theory as simply exhibiting the facticity of 
universal laws. It is similarly difficult, if not impossible, 
for us Lutherans to see being simultaneously saints and 
sinners, or dividing our lives into two paradoxically 
related kingdoms as anything other than just the way 
things are. To return to the allusion to Jesus' words 
which began this paragraph, "criticism of myths should 
begin at home," or, perhaps, "people who live in mythic 
constructs shouldn't throw bricks." 
My experience of Reformation Sunday this year began 
with a disconcerting moment. The celebrant called us to 
begin worship by saying, "Today the Church gathers to 
celebrate the Reformation." Instantaneously I 
experienced an intellectual vertigo as my mind teetered 
on the brink of a chasm filled with variant definitions of 
church. None of my Roman Catholic friends had this 
particular Sunday marked on their calendars. (They don't 
even celebrate Counter Reformation Sunday!) I briefly 
wondered how many of the world's Orthodox Christians 
are aware that a thing called The Reformation took place, 
or could name its major players. My mind recoiled at the 
thought that those in the Anabaptist tradition, whose 
ancestors Lutherans tortured and killed in the name of 
Jesus had much to celebrate with us. I struggled to try 
and name even other mainstream Protestant 
denominations that marked this day with such finely 
focused festival. I tried desperately to remember from 
when I was a United Methodist pastor, still blissfully 
ignorant in his Arminianism that he was predestined to be 
a Lutheran, if Methodists made much of Reformation 
Day. But I could not remember having ever told my 
congregation we had gathered to celebrate Reformation 
Sunday. Would those in the Reformed tradition be 
celebrating the same things I was meant as a Lutheran to 
be celebrating? (And if they did, wouldn't John Calvin be 
watching somewhat uncomfortably from Heaven?) What 
exactly were we celebrating for The Church? And why 
was I having such a difficult time imagining all the 
Church as seeing the same (or any) celebratory content in 
the Reformation? All this flashed through my mind 
before the Brief Order of Confession, like one's life 
replaying itself just before death. 
Anyone even slightly aware of ecumenical moves in the 
past decades will object that this is much too complex a 
topic to fit between the Greeting and the Brief Order. I 
have left out a great deal. First, I need to make clear that 
I am speaking from my experience. My life has played 
out in formal relationship to four different Protestant 
denominations (currently ELCA) and in informal 
relations with many others. I am reflecting on my sense 
of grass-roots understandings and celebrations of 
Reformation Sunday, not the way in which this festival 
Sunday is viewed by clergy types intimate with liturgical 
calendars and ecumenical committees. Reformation Day 
does appear on the calendars of a significant number of 
Protestant churches. However, in a brief and non-
scientific survey of on-line calendars I found it often to 
be printed parenthetically. Lutheran celebration of 
INTERSECTIONS/Summer 2004 
-24-
Reformation Sunday is anything but parenthetical! Thus 
not being able to recall a single Sunday as a Methodist 
pastor having formally focused liturgy and sermon on the 
Reformation, even though it was most likely printed on 
denominational calendars, is not surprising. Methodists 
just don't identify with the Reformation as Lutherans do. 
And in meetings with clergy colleagues, I don't 
remember it as topic of conversation. ("I need new ideas 
for Reformation sermons. Got any?") In my five years 
as a member of the Church of England, All Saints always 
trumped the Reformation. (I am, tongue-in-cheek, 
doubtful that many Lutheran laity even know that All 
Saints is a liturgical day!) 
I am certain that my Roman Catholic friends are unaware 
of our premier Sunday for similar reasons. Yes, a year 
ago Roman Catholics and Lutherans signed an historic 
accord. Catholics now have on their liturgical calendar 
"Reformation/Reconciliation" Sunday. Yet when I talk 
with real Catholics who fill Roman pews on Sundays it is 
not in their awareness. If it is being celebrated in their 
churches it went unnoticed by large numbers. Other 
celebrations trump their awareness of our Lutheran day. 
These thoughts having interfered with listening to the 
readings the sermon pulled me back into the service and 
answered many of my questions, at least the ones about 
what we were celebrating. It was an articulate and 
creative rehearsal of the gifts Luther brought to the 
Church. 2 It laid out in enlightening prose and apt 
metaphor issues of conuption set against theological 
insights of grace and faith which exposed the abuses. 
The speaker's story told of the restatement of an age-old 
Pauline-Augustinian theology which was God's 
prescription for healing the abuses that had crept into the 
Church. The sermon went on to ask the ongoing question 
of Lutheranism, "Given such underserved grace freely 
bestowed upon the vilest of sinners who continue to be 
sinners, just how is it we live out the need to behave 
ourselves?" We do so in the paradox, of course, of being 
simultaneously both saints and sinners. We live the life 
of grace in the struggle of being what we are not. All 
good Lutheran stuff! 
My (formerly Wesleyan) heart was strangely warmed, if 
not perfected. This was a festival Sunday. We genuinely 
have much to celebrate. The world was righted, the 
vertigo gone. Once again neatly opaque my Lutheranism 
anchored my universe. Or did it? Experiences of seeing 
through are not so easily exorcised. The initial 
experience of this festival Sunday would not go away, 
even though it struck such a convenient paradoxical 
balance with the exposition of Lutheran theology. 
The real issue is, of course, not the importance of the 
Reformation and Luther's magisterial place in starting it, 
nor is the issue the choice of a festival day to focus such 
importance. Luther must be somewhere in anyone's list 
of top ten theologians. He ranked quite high in Time 
Magazine's list of most important people for the last 
millennium (but then so did Aquinas). Although 
Protestantism could have arisen from other persons and 
events, we cannot ignore that it in fact began with Luther. 
All Protestants owe him a debt. Catholics cannot ignore 
the historical impact he has had on their beliefs and 
structures as well. All of this goes without saying. 
The issue is how the myth is told, framed, celebrated; it is 
the significance drawn from the story. Roman Catholics 
almost certainly tell the story with an emphasis on the 
present, and reconciliation.3 It is a day to celebrate 
healing of past wounds and misunderstandings. From a 
Catholic theological perspective it is not that Catholic 
doctrine has changed. It is the recognition that common 
vocabulary and frameworks now exist which allow us to 
see that we were always trying to say the same thing, but 
in differing keys. The Reformation was, in one sense, a 
talking-past one another. We now celebrate talking-to 
one another. My experience of Lutheran celebrations is 
quite different. The focus tends to be on the past. The 
locus of holiness and sanctity is on a "then," which we 
try to recapture for our "now." Some Lutheran laity (and 
some clergy) I have spoken with saw the Joint 
Declaration more as a they-finally-got-it, a see-we-were­
right-all-along. The myth, even after the Joint 
Declaration, was celebrated to confirm superiority with 
its attendant separation. 
Although told as if this was a new experience this 
Reformation Sunday, in truth the story reveals an 
ongoing struggle I have with my Lutheran identity. I am 
in many ways disadvantaged in achieving the elusive 
goal of a being a good Lutheran. One is that I am a 
biblical scholar/theologian. I live in a professional 
relationship with a book that continues to astound me 
with its ability to say one thing in a first reading and 
something very different in the second or hundredth 
reading. A multivalent (perhaps, infinitely-valent) God 
uses the Bible I read to consistently step outside my 
hermeneutical frames to say the unexpected, to say things 
my theologically preconceived gospel sometimes says 
God can't say. The God of the texts I read professionally 
is sometimes a Jew, or a Baptist, sometimes a Catholic, 
often Orthodox, and frequently Lutheran, but never 
settles into any one viewpoint. Seeing both, indeed all, 
sides of a text is a curiously de-centering, unnerving 
practice. And this cubist dismantling of theologically 
unified views to see all sides of a thing also applies to 
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how I look at the founding myths of Lutheranism in its 
reading/telling of the theological and historical stories of 
the Reformation. 
A curious feature of foundational myths is the way in 
which they frequently hide or obfuscate a dark side of the 
events they celebrate. Those of us who came of age 
during Vietnam and Watergate will never again hear the 
myths of American origins in the same way. This is true 
even if, post 9/11, we might like to recapture some small 
part of a patriotic naivete. The realities behind our 
founding national myths were, in fact, less about freedom 
and justice and more about privileged and advantaged 
white-males seeking a still more privileged institutional 
structure to be able to exploit more effectively their 
advantages over others and the environment than the 
British Crown and Parliament were willing to allow. Our 
nation's founding myths fail to speak of American 
Patriots set over against American Loyalists and the 
silencing of the latter in the myth telling process. We 
silence the Native Americans who fought for the British 
having prophetically seen that the revolutionary rhetoric 
of freedom and justice would not be for them. Our 
stories, in their orthodox form, fail to speak of an 
uncompromising militant belligerency intent on its own 
way no matter what. What dark secrets fail to be told in 
our recounting of the Reformation in its guise as the 
foundational myth of Lutheranism? 
For all the good Luther unleashed, he also helped in 
birthing unspeakable horrors. He (we Lutherans) was 
(are) no less culpable in the sin of schism than was Pope 
Leo. The oft trumpeted sincerity of Lutherans in efforts 
to avoid schism does not lessen the culpability. In the 
end both sides schismed. It takes two to tango. This is 
true, even if in historical judgment, as a post-colonial 
analysis might suggest, a greater burden is placed on the 
Papacy because of its institutional power. The Pandora's 
Box, Luther himself only wanted to crack open, was 
opened nonetheless. In the wake of the Reformation the 
Body of Christ has been hopelessly fragmented. So 
much so that one of the chief tasks of post-modem 
theology has been to remake a vice into a virtue. The 
Reformation for all its good, spawned more than a 
century of religious warfare in which millions died in the 
name of Jesus.4 Protestants killed Catholics, Catholics 
killed Protestants and everybody killed Anabaptists.5 
Even though the historical causation of these events is 
incredibly complex, it is at least true that this horrendous 
evil occurred because each side insisted that somehow 
their reading of God was privileged, their foundational 
myth alone was sacred.6 They claimed their definition of 
gospel exhaustive and full to the exclusion of other 
insights. Europe emerged from the carnage so tired of 
Christian squabbles and so convinced of the abject failure 
of Christianity to provide answers to life that it has yet to 
recover from the ensuing wave of secularism. From any 
viewpoint, the Reformation was a mixed bag. Indeed, a 
Lutheran take may be a satisfying analysis. So full of 
hope, promise and good the Reformation, under the 
tutelage of human sinfulness, became a tool of both 
divine grace and demonic hate. 
It is also problematic that Luther himself was such a truly 
mythic figure. Diverse in his thinking, prolific in literary 
output, shifting costumes throughout life, his theology 
developing and shifting across his life, and with a flair for 
flamboyance and over statement Luther's legendary 
status even during his lifetime was already writ larger 
than life. The shear mass of materials, stories and first 
and second hand accounts creates an historical problem 
similar to that encountered in attempting to understand 
Jesus. The discontinuity between the Luther of history 
and the Reformer of Faith is real, even if Lessing's great 
ugly ditch is not quite as great or ugly. As the Father of 
Protestantism Luther's person and thought belong not 
only to Lutherans, but to countless others who follow his 
legacy. 
The diversity of appropriation of both his person and 
thought mean that there are multiple interpretations of 
just who he was and what his ideological legacy should 
be. Baptists can in some measure own an interpretation 
of Luther, even though they don't always self-identify as 
Protestants. If I were Baptist I would find it hard to 
forgive, even after 500 years. But time eases hurt and 
Baptists can identify with the fact that "Luther was a 
radical."7 Radical?! That isn't the Luther I meet in 
Lutheran circles. That Luther is almost always distanced 
by parsecs from anything smacking of radicality (which 
still includes anything remotely Anabaptist). Methodist 
wouldn't exist without Wesley's auditory experience of 
Luther's Preface to Romans, yet the Luther I knew as a 
Methodist was colored like Menno Simmons. This is not 
the Luther I have met since becoming a Lutheran. Such 
a mythic figure, capable of multiple appropriations from 
various interpretive frames, cannot be monopolized. 
Diversity of interpretation will follow in such a person's 
wake. The Reformationt Luther was a part of are much 
more complex than Lutherans, or even Protestants in 
general have allowed.8 All tellings of the story are thus 
selective. And there's the rub. 
We have learned from Michel Foucault that all human 
activities are in some way tainted with desire for power. 
Human telling of the most holy stories for the purest of 
expressed intentions nevertheless can hide latent plays for 
power and control over others. The complexity of 
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Luther, his thought and legacy contribute to the dark side 
of our foundational myths when we insist on rehearsing 
the story to support our theological constructs, 
institutions, history, denominational clout, and to bolster 
our membership roles to the implied exclusion of 
differing theologies and institutions which, in some 
manner different than ours, also look to Luther for at least 
partial inspiration for their existence. 
It is to be expected that the dark side would be 
suppressed in our celebration of the Reformation Myth. 
Such a telling of the myth would have a tendency to 
undermine the ideological means by which we construct 
our Lutheran identities. We want to be the guys in the 
white hats. It was, of course, others who are culpable for 
the evils of the Reformation. If only they had listened to 
us, all this could have been avoided! 
So just how should this myth be told? Mythic origins can 
be told over and against the other. This is, it would 
seem, the normal way in which they have functioned in 
human history. One group tells its story of good and 
right over and against the outsider, the evildoer, and the 
unenlightened. In sociological analysis, this is simply 
good strategy for building group identity and cohesion. 
Well-defined group boundaries over against other groups 
in the environment are necessary for group survival. And 
when God's truth is what's at stake in the group's 
survival, well, this becomes serious business indeed. 
These latent needs for institutional continuance lurk 
unseen in our appropriation of our history. So, our 
Reformation myth continues to be told in ways that set us 
over and against other Christians; continues to be 
rehearsed so that our institutional structures are 
strengthened, keeping our fences repaired, and our gates 
guarded. It can do so even as we work to be more 
ecumenical. Can we tell our foundational myth another 
way? 
I would suggest that as Lutherans in our corporate and 
individual worship we need to explore ways of telling 
and remembering our foundational myth that are not over 
and against, but together with the rest of the Church. 
Some years ago I was part of a search committee 
screening candidates for a teaching position at our ELCA 
college. 9 The position was specified to teach Lutheran 
theology. However, given that only some 30% of our 
student body was Lutheran, we had come to the decision 
that this professor needed to be a very ecumenical 
Lutheran. I had learned in my own teaching that working 
at an ELCA college meant I had to be much LESS 
Lutheran than, say, a Lutheran chaplain at a state 
university. I had to respect, accept and give validity to 
the theological positions of Methodists, Baptists, 
Catholics, Episcopalians, and a host of other Christian 
viewpoints in my classroom or my teaching would be a 
failure. The classroom necessitated that there had to be 
some sort of mere Christianity we were all trying to get at 
and to which each was contributing differing pieces. I 
could not simply teach Lutheranism as the viewpoint, 
even though I worked hard to ensure that this view was 
well comprehended. 
In this light we decided to ask candidates two related 
questions. First, what does the Church Catholic need to 
learn from the Lutheran tradition? Hardly any of the 
card-carrying Lutheran Ph.D.s we interviewed found this 
difficult. Then we asked, "What do Lutherans need to 
learn from other Christian denominations?" Many 
candidates choked. Others began to talk incoherently and 
unconvincingly. Some almost immediately said, 
"Nothing!" The few who spoke articulately to this 
question made the cut. I found it surprising that so many 
Lutheran trained theologians were unable to see the rest 
of the Church as a gift to us, and that their vision ended 
with our Lutheranism as the only gift God had given the 
Church. 
James Sanders, has, in the context of understanding early 
Christian-Jewish relations, spoken of two types of 
reading: constitutive reading and prophetic reading. 10
Constitutive reading assumes that the blessings of 
scripture are directed to one's own group and the 
curses/challenges of scripture are directed to outsiders. It 
is a reading which builds group confidence in the idea 
that group membership equates with access to the truth 
and right living. Prophetic reading takes as its stance an 
internal hermeneutic of suspicion in which the negatives 
of scripture could be read as applying to "us." We all 
usually wish to identify with the good guys in a story. 
We read of the disciples and say, "That's us!" We look 
at the Pharisees and say, "Wow! They are bad." 
Prophetic reading is to say, "We're the Pharisees. Help!" 
It is a reading which takes seriously the possibility that 
standing within a tradition one could challenge the 
tradition itself as insufficient or perhaps even wrong. 
(Lutherans are always ready to acknowledge this stance 
vis-a-vis our status as sinners, but tend to be blind to its 
critique of the self-righteousness we find in having good 
theology.) Prophetic reading is to acknowledge the 
failure inherent in one's own ideological positionality. 
Several years ago an ELCA seminary president was 
visiting the campus at which I was teaching. I remember 
only a single sentence from that day. It was, "Lutherans 
need to repent of the Reformation." It was so shocking 
as to burn itself indelibly into my memory. If I 
remember correctly this was near to the time that Pope 
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John Paul II had begun initiatives for Catholics to repent 
of institutional failures across the centuries. Perhaps this 
had influenced his statement. But it comes back to haunt 
me periodically. 
If the Reformation itself was/is a mixed bag, so should 
our celebration of it on its festival day be. I envision the 
celebrant standing to say, "Today we gather to repent of 
our sins in the Reformation!" "Today the Church gathers 
to celebrate Reformation Sunday!" The juxtapositioning 
of such a discordant proclamation gets at knocking us out 
of our complacency about the inherent goodness, 
righteousness, of our theological and institutional 
identity. Dealing with it in this paradoxical manner is 
curiously more Lutheran than only telling one side of the 
myth. To do so would address liturgically the way in 
which Lutheranism, if understood as protest against all 
human ism-ing, de-centers itself and would view such a 
de-centering of the ism as a good thing. It is to read 
ourselves in our Lutheranism against a prophetic critique 
and to let it unnerve the simplicity of our identity as 
Lutherans. If we wish to begin to learn to tell this 
foundational myth together with11 rather than over and 
against we will have to begin by owning our complicity 
in the beginning of12 and continuance of division in the 
Body of Christ. We will have to learn both sides of our 
myth, its dark side as well as its glorious side. We need 
to mix repentance for the dark together with celebration 
of the glory. And, perhaps even more difficult, we will 
need to begin to relativize the glory we identify in our 
theological heritage in the context of a God who speaks 
through others than just us. When we invite Baptists, 
Pentecostals, Catholics, and the new Evangelicals to 
come and teach us on Reformation Sunday we will have 
begun to own a new relationship to our foundational 
myths and will have begun a worthy celebration of the 
Reformation for the whole Church. 
Thomas W. Martin is professor of religion at Susquehanna University in Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania. 
Notes 
1 Simone de Beauvoir's sense of "other," not Emmanuel Levinas'. 
2 It was preached by Rev. Mark Radecke, Chaplain to the University, Susquehanna University, Selinsgrove, PA, not only to celebrate 
the Reformation, but also to commemorate the 25th anniversary of his ordination to the ministry of Word and Sacrament. 
3 E.g. www.saintjosephcathedral.org/sitemaplbulletins!Bulletins_2000/l0292000.htm
4 I almost always avoid any red clothing on Reformation Day. I know that the overt message is of the Church's foundation in the 
blood of Christ and the Martyrs. But the covert message is of the towns and villages of Europe turned blood red by the slaughter of 
children, women, old men, as well as soldiers, all to glorify Jesus. This makes the liturgical red tradition a participation in Christian 
imperialist triumphalism I can no longer stomach. 
5 Just recently I had a conversation with a fellow church member who was proudly telling me of his son-in-law's doctoral research in 
Spain on Spanish persecution of Lutherans. The story was told with pregnant body language and vocal emphasis to indicate that 
"they" persecuted, "we" didn't. 
6 Cf. Regina Schwartz, The Curse of Cain: The Violent Legacy of Monotheism (Chicago: 1997). 
7 Found in my unscientific survey at www.tribune.org/Archivesffribune/2002/0ctoberPg30.shtml 
8 Cf. Felipe Fernandez-Armesto and Derek Wilson, Reformations:A Radical Interpretation of Christianity and the World ( 1500-2000), 
(New York: Scribner's, 1996). 
9 Midland Lutheran College, Fremont, NE. 
1°First laid out in a series of articles in the 1970s: esp. ''From Isaiah 61 to Luke 4" in Christianity, Judaism and Other Greco-Roman 
Cults, Ed. Jacob Neusner (Leiden, E.J. Brill: 1975). 
11 It must be acknowledged that such explorations are beginning and services planned to focus on reconciliation over division do exist. 
12 This is not to forget that Catholics and the Orthodox have a whole other context to deal with this in light of the Great Schism, which 
predates our contribution to Christian division by 500 years. 
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The Ought 
Ned Wisnefske 
Nobody likes the Ought. Everyone tries to flee from the 
Ought whenever it comes around, or even deny it exists. 
Moral education is all about the Ought: we ought to do 
this; we ought not to do that. There is opposition to 
moral education in college, from students as well as 
faculty, because not even they want to hear this or be 
around the Ought. Some say (with respects to Dr. Seuss), 
"You cannot teach morals to college students because it 
is too late. They have already been formed by family, 
school, church, and state." Or else you hear, "You 
cannot teach values to college students because that 
would mold them. You must only expose them, not 
compose them." 
Now note something about these two very common 
claims: they make opposite assumptions. The first 
complaint assumes that students are already formed (and 
can no longer be shaped morally), whereas the second 
charge assumes that students are not formed (and should 
shape themselves). Curiously, you hear both objections 
out of the same mouth in the same conversation: "You 
cannot teach morals because students' morals are already 
formed." "You cannot teach morals because you will 
form students' morals." Both cannot be true. 
Why do we hear these contradictory objections to moral 
formation? The answer is that both share the same fear, 
the fear of the Ought. As is often the case, opposites are 
joined by a common threat. In this case, both feel 
threatened by the demands posed by the Ought. They 
feel threatened because the Ought intends to shape them 
in ways they do not want. So when students meet moral 
demands in the classroom and feel the presence of the 
Ought they will say, "The Ought cannot be real. Since 
our upbringings are so diverse, and we see things so 
differently, the Ought has to be something different for 
each us." In this way they convince themselves that the 
Ought is not actually there in the classroom with them at 
all, but only their personal, pet oughts-which is not the 
real animal. Or, when some faculty find out that the 
Ought has been allowed into the classroom, they 
complain, "The Ought must leave. There must only be 
oughts in the room. Only those oughts are allowed which 
we choose to be oughts." In so professing they too 
banish the Ought, since an ought we choose is really not 
the Ought at all. (A clever way to deny the Ought­
while appearing to acknowledge it-is to allow that we 
each already have oughts we bring with us, so why 
concern ourselves with the Ought which supposedly 
encounters us?) Once more, when the Ought starts to 
enter, we close the classroom door. 
This fear and denial of the Ought tells us something 
important about ourselves. For one, the fact that we feel 
threatened shows that we sense the presence of the 
Ought. How else do we explain our contradictory 
objections to the moral formation of students, or why we 
protest so zealously against it? If the Ought were really 
nothing, we would simply ignore it, as we would the 
claim that there is a ghost in the room. We feel 
threatened because we realize that the Ought intends to 
shape us. That is why we flee from it and even deny it 
exists. Evidently we have the mind, heart, and will to 
sense the Ought, to respond to it, and to be shaped by it, 
yet we do not want to use those capacities. Finally, what 
does it say about us that we realize something exists, yet 
refuse to respond to it and even deny it? It says that there 
is something obstinate about our moral nature. This 
entrenched stubbornness, whatever it is, prevents us from 
seeing moral demand before our eyes, and obstructs 
moral education. 
How might we overcome this obstinacy? Can we get the 
Ought in the classroom without causing students and 
faculty to flee? As we have seen, we refuse to see the 
Ought in front of us; but we might sense it behind us, 
nudging us. Perhaps there we can hear its presence and 
not close our ears, feel its breath and its clasp on our 
shoulders and not cover up. 
It might work this way. Let students and faculty begin by 
supposing that there really could be an Ought. (Isn't it
possible that moral demand encounters us and is not 
invented by us? That the difference between right and 
wrong is objective and not subjective?) Then, let us see 
whether we might find out what the Ought is, if together 
we search for it by using our moral capacities: examining 
our moral senses, applying the rules common to us, and 
weighing our moral judgments, discerning the better ones 
from the worse. 
When we do that we may not find the Ought, though it 
will find us; for then we will realize that the persons 
participating in this enterprise deserve respect. To 
exercise our capacities to be impartial, to sympathize, and 
to exert our free will gives us distinction and sets us apart 
as beings with dignity. To realize this is to be grasped by 
the claim that humans should and should not be treated in 
certain ways. When that happens the Ought has entered 
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the room and nudged us. Then we can no longer deny it, 
and we will realize that we need not fear it, though we 
might be awed by it. 
This might seem like a small thing, a naught rather than 
the Ought, but in that little thing is contained most 
everything. For it is the Ought which shapes our minds 
to think clearly, our hearts to feel genuinely, and our 
wills to act rightly. The Ought can reform the formations 
of our past, and transform our wants to give purpose to 
our future. 
It is never, therefore, too late, or a mistake, to be shaped 
by the Ought. 
Ned Wisnefske is professor of religion and philosophy at Roanoke College in Salem, Virginia. 
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Un possible 
Tim Knopp 
Some say childhood ends in the period between high school 
and college, that in growing up you make a trade off 
like bartering baseball cards with the neighbor, "I'll give you late night talks with friends 
foooor a career in education. Or how 'bout two Wet Willy's for a Jack Daniels?" 
It seems fair, maybe, that this should be, as I twist 
the shower knobs and test the water with a single sandled foot. I step 
into the warm stream, stand a moment before bathing. 
I've given four years to this higher education, four years closer 
to some hidden knowledge, four years farther from what I once knew, 
four years of reading Emerson, watching "The Simpsons," 
thinking, Me fail English? That's unpossible. The chimes ring 
in the afternoon sun. It's noon and the ding-ding-BONG of the bells 
pulls me to the heart of the warm, bubbling campus. 
Around the grassy courtyard, strewn bodies teach strewn bodies 
about relationships, advice about hard topics coming all too easy. 
They read a poem, write a song, talk the physics of cigarette ash 
and how long it can grow before falling, clumped or floating 
on the wind, from their scissored fingers. Along the worn brick paths 
professors walk side by side with students, taste an apple 
between classes, hear the latest political news, or ask 
squirrelly freshmen, "What is love?" They don't know, of course, 
that the answer doesn't start, "Love is," but rather "Love can be." 
For now I spend evenings with friends, say, "You should have heard 
what this kid in my second period class said," or just play Tecmo 
Super Bowl on the original Nintendo, an old school game for those 
trying to remember their old school days. 
Tim Knopp graduated from Capital University as an education major on May 8, 2004. 
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Augsburg College 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 
Augustana College 
Rock Island, Illinois 
Augustana College 
Sioux Falls, South Dakota 
Bethany College 
Lindsborg, Kansas 
California Lutheran University 
Thousand Oaks, California 
Capital University 
Columbus, Ohio 
Carthage College 
Kenosha, Wisconsin 
Concordia College 
Moorhead, Minnesota 
Dana College 
Blair, Nebraska 
Finlandia University 
Hancock, Michigan 
Gettysburg College 
Gettysburg, Pennsylvania 
Grand View College 
Des Moines, Iowa 
Gustavus Adolphus College 
St. Peter, Minnesota 
Lenoir-Rhyne College 
Hickory, North Carolina 
Luther College 
Decorah, Iowa 
Midland Lutheran College 
Fremont, Nebraska 
Muhlenberg College 
Allentown, Pennsylvania 
Newberry College 
Newberry, South Carolina 
Pacific Lutheran University 
Tacoma, Washington 
Roanoke College 
Salem, Virginia 
St. Olaf College 
Northfield, Minnesota 
Susquehanna University 
Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania 
Texas Lutheran University 
Seguin, Texas 
Thiel College 
Greenville, Pennsylvania 
Wagner College 
Staten Island, New York 
Waldorf College 
Forest City, Iowa 
Wartburg College 
Waverly, Iowa 
Wittenberg University 
Springfield, Ohio 
